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INTRODUCTION

"There is definitely going to be another financial crisis around the
corner because we haven't solved any of the things that caused the
previous crisis," said hedge fund legend Mark Mobius, speaking in Tokyo
nearly a full year after the United States officially embarked upon the
greatest reform of financial services regulation since the New Deal.'
Today, the world is still reeling from the recent financial crisis, which
ravaged even the strongest economies and left them battling recession,
budget deficits, soaring unemployment, and political discontent.2 Facing

1. Kana Nishizawa, Mobius Says Another Financial Crisis Around the Corner',
BLOOMBERG.COM, May 30, 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-30/mobius-says-freshfinancial-crisis-around-corner-amid-volatile-derivatives.html. At the time of his remarks, Mobius was
the head of the $50-billion emerging markets investments operations at Templeton Asset Management.
Id.
2. For a discussion of the economic and societal costs of the recent financial crisis, see Cheryl
D. Block, Measuringthe True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REv. 149, 159 (2010) ("A
simple tally of dollars authorized or disbursed, of course, is wholly inadequate to accurately assess the
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another financial crisis in this situation is a frightening prospect. National
governments, individually or in any G-denominated combination, may
simply be out of magic bullets-as well as money and goodwill of their
citizens-with which to fight the next war.
In this context, preventing the next financial meltdown becomes a
survival imperative. To be effective, however, crisis prevention efforts
must be comprehensive and coherent, and target the fundamental problems
in financial markets instead of getting mired in the sea of small "fixes" to
the system. One of the fundamental causes of the recent crisis was the
unprecedented degree of complexity and interconnectedness in modern

financial markets, and the woeful inability of both private market actors
and public authorities to understand and manage the risks these factors
posed to systemic financial stability. Complex financial instruments,
markets, and institutions create levels of opacity, interdependence, and
unpredictability which significantly increase the potential for market
inefficiency and systemic failure of dangerous proportions. Complexity
enables private market actors to engage in excessive financial speculation
and tax and regulatory arbitrage, which further increase systemic risk and
contribute little to productive economic growth. Despite their ambitious
reach, post-crisis regulatory reforms do not appear to offer effective
solutions to the fundamental dilemma of regulating complexity and
systemic risk in financial markets.6 Much of the current academic and

ultimate taxpayer cost of government bailouts."); Claire R. Kelly, FinancialCrises and Civil Society,
11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 505 (2011) (describing societal consequences of the financial crisis from a global
perspective).
3. There is a vast collection of literature analyzing the dynamics of risk accumulation in the
financial system, which ultimately led to the crisis. For a sample of this literature, see generally
Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007 2008, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP. 77 (2009); Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the FinancialCrisis, 21 CRIT.
REV. 195 (2009); Gary Gorton, The Subprime Panic, 15 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 10 (2008); Oren Bar-Gill,
The Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073
(2009); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009); see also infra
note 11.
4. For scholarly analyses of complexity in financial markets and its implications for systemic
stability and efficiency, see, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in FinancialMarkets, 87
WASH. U. L. REv. 211 (2010); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern
FinancialMarkets (U. of Oxford Legal Res. Paper No. 49, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1916649; Manuel A. Utset, Complex FinancialInstitutions and Systemic
Risk, 45 GA. L. REV. 779 (2011).
5. Systemic risk can be defined as the risk "of widespread failures of financial institutions or
freezing up of capital markets that can substantially reduce the supply of capital to the real economy."
Viral V. Acharya et al., Prologue: A Bird's-Eye View, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: How TO
REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 1, 1 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2009). Another popular definition refers

to systemic risk as "the risk that (iJ)an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers
(through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain

66

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:63

policy debate tends to focus on discrete reform measures, mostly aimed at
enhancing or finessing the same regulatory tools and approaches that
failed to prepare us for the devastating effects of the latest crisis.
Ultimately, these measures fail to answer directly the fundamental
normative question: how much financial risk is too much for society to
bear?
This Article pushes the boundaries of the debate by directly
confronting that fundamental policy issue. It starts with a simple premise:
if we cannot effectively regulate and control systemic risk associated with
the increasing complexity in financial markets, we need to reduce and
control the overall level of complexity in the system. Because much of that
risk-generating complexity is a result of strategic efforts of financial
intermediaries that structure, market, and deal in complex financial
instruments, the most radical and direct method of reducing systemic risk
is to insert regulatory controls at the point of product development, before
the risk is introduced into the financial system. This Article argues that
one potentially effective form of such ex ante regulatory control is premarket government licensing of complex financial instruments-including
derivatives, asset-backed securities, and other structured products.
Product approval has long been the model of pharmaceutical drug
regulation in the United States and has recently been introduced in the
European Union's chemicals regulation. It is not commonly known,
however, that a similar system of pre-trading "contract designation" also
existed in the area of the U.S. commodity futures regulation prior to 2000.8

of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or
decreases in its availability, often evidenced by substantial financial-marketplace volatility." Steven L.
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEo. L.J. 193, 204 (2008).
6. See infra notes 57-64 and accompanying text.
7. For a provocative critique of the current reform efforts in the United States, see SIMON
JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, THIRTEEN BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010); DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING

THE

DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2010).

8. See infra Part II.C. In today's financial markets, there are numerous examples of substantive
review of financial products and transactions by public authorities and various quasi-public and private
parties. These include merit-based review of securities offerings under state Blue Sky laws, various
levels of pre-approval of certain insurance policies and rates by state insurance regulators, regulatory
pre-approval of certain new activities and investments by federally-insured depository institutions and
their parent companies, and the review of proposed horizontal mergers by the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission. See generally PATRICIA A. McCoY, BANKING LAW MANUAL

§§ 5.015.03 (2012) (analyzing limitations on powers and activities of banks and bank holding
companies); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 329-34 (Rev. 5th ed. 2006)
(describing state regulation of securities transactions); RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF
BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (4th ed. 2009) (detailing regulation of banking organizations

and insurance companies). Product design assessment also takes place in the process of listing
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Building on these three examples, the Article offers the first
comprehensive examination of whether, and how, the concept of product
approval regulation can be applied to reduce systemic risk posed by
complex financial instruments.9
The core of the proposal advanced in this Article is the process for
product approval, which would require financial institutions to make an
affirmative showing that each complex financial product they intend to
market meets three statutory tests: (1) an "economic purpose" test, which
would place the burden of proving the social and commercial utility of
each proposed financial instrument on the financial institutions seeking its
approval; (2) an "institutional capacity" test, which would require a review
of the applicant firm's ability to effectively manage the risks and monitor
the market dynamics of the proposed product; and (3) a broad "systemic
effects" test, which would require a finding that approval of the proposed
product would not pose an unacceptable risk of increasing systemic
vulnerability and otherwise will not raise significant public policy
concerns.
The proposed approach does not prohibit any financial activities. It
merely imposes the duty to provide information necessary for evaluating
potential risks and benefits of a specific financial product on the party that
has the best access to such information and the greatest incentives not to
disclose it voluntarily. The proposed approval process would provide a
mechanism for ensuring that financial innovation and the creation of
complex financial instruments actually advance productive economic
enterprise and offer real public benefits. By eliminating socially

approval by securities exchanges, issuance of credit ratings by the credit rating agencies, and issuance
of legal opinions by law firms evaluating the validity and legal effects of specific financial products
and transactions. In this broader sense, the concept of product approval regulation advocated in this
Article may be viewed as a variation on this well-established theme in financial services regulation and
private market ordering. Generally, however, the scope and purposes of these product review schemes
limit their usefulness as directly comparable models of approval-based risk regulation.
9. As discussed below, several proposals for regulatory approval of consumer financial products
were advanced in 2008-09. The main justification for those proposals was the need to protect ordinary
Americans from potentially "unsafe" financial products that could damage their financial well-being.
See infra Part I.C. By contrast, this Article proposes introducing a mandatory licensing scheme for
complex financial instruments that typically are not sold directly to retail consumers. The primary
policy focus of the proposed scheme should be prevention of excessive accumulation of systemic risk
in the financial sector. Recently, Professors Eric Posner and E. Glen Weyl advocated a similar idea of
a licensing regime to reduce speculation in derivatives. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for
FinancialInnovation: Applying the Insurable Interest Doctrine to the Twenty-First-Century Financial
Markets (John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 589, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2010606. Their proposal, however, differs in several important
respects from the proposal advanced here and offers the more traditional economic analysis that
focuses on curbing welfare-reducing financial speculation.
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counterproductive complexity, this approach would also potentially
enhance the efficiency of financial markets and the reliability of traditional
mechanisms of private market discipline.
The proposed model of mandatory approval of complex financial
products is bound to generate controversy and invite criticism. It raises
many legitimate questions about the proper scope, feasibility, and potential
consequences of instituting such an intrusive regulatory scheme. This
Article does not purport to give complete answers to all of these questions.
Rather, it offers an intellectual experiment, an exploratory attempt to flesh
out an idea that may appear too radical and politically untenable today.
The next big crisis may very well change that perception.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I sets forth a normative
justification for an ex ante approach to managing complexity and reducing
systemic risk in financial markets. Part II examines key features of three
historical experiments with product approval regulation: pre-approval of
new drugs by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), the new
system of registration and authorization of chemicals in the European
Union, and a mandatory contract approval scheme administered by the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") from 1974 to 2000.
Part III outlines a proposal for product approval regulation of complex
financial instruments and transactions. It also discusses some of the key
criticisms and challenges of implementing this idea in practice.
I. A CASE FOR PRODUCT APPROVAL REGULATION IN THE FINANCIAL
SECTOR

A. Strategic Complexity and Systemic Risk
The financial crisis of 2007-09 was the first truly global and systemic
crisis. 10 Many factors contributed to the accumulation of excess risk and
hidden leverage in the financial sector, which led to massive near-failure
and taxpayer-funded bailouts of the world's largest financial institutions."

10. See Saule T. Omarova, The Neii Crisis for the New Century: Some Observations on the
"Big-Picture" Lessons of the Global FinancialCrisis of2008, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 157 (2009).
11. For a sample of detailed analyses of the causes of the financial crisis of 2007-09, see, e.g.,
FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMMN,
NATIONAL
STATES

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE

COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED

(2011), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf;

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE

ANATOMY

OF FINANCIAL

ON INVESTIGATIONS,

COLLAPSE

(2011)

UNITED

WALL STREET AND

[hereinafter

THE LEVIN

STATES

SENATE

THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:

REPORT],

available at

http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/ files/Financial Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf; UNITED KINGDOM'S
FIN.

SERV.

AUTHORITY,

THE TURNER REVIEW:

A REGULATORY

RESPONSE

TO

THE GLOBAL
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One of the fundamental causes of that crisis, however, was the
unprecedented level of complexity of financial products and markets,
which resulted from the great successes of financial innovation of the precrisis decades. 2
Since the 1980s, rapid proliferation of increasingly complex financial
instruments, including over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives, asset-backed
securities, and other structured products, transformed the dynamics of the
financial sector's operation and created a qualitatively new source of
systemic instability in financial markets.13 Derivatives are financial
instruments whose value derives from the value of other assets, referred to
as underlying or reference assets. 14 Anything that has a quantifiable value
subject to fluctuation can serve as a reference asset, either alone or in an
endless variety of combinations: interest and currency exchange rates,
prices of securities or commodities, changes in the creditworthiness of
third parties, or macroeconomic indicators. Asset-backed securities and
structured notes also derive their value from the value of underlying assets
generating streams of payments: pools of mortgages and other loans,
certain loan-like leases or other asset-backed securities.1 In essence, all of
these instruments enabled unbundling, reconfiguring, and trading of
financial risk as an asset in its own right, separate from any physical asset
or financial instrument that initially gave rise to such risk.
By allowing market actors to tailor investments to their individual risk
appetites and needs, these instruments unlocked great potential for more
effective hedging of financial exposure and for greater flow of capital and

FINANCIAL CRISIS (2009) [hereinafter TURNER REVIEw], available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/
other/turner review.pdf.
12. Omarova, supra note 10, at 157; Schwarcz, supra note 4; Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation
Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657 (2012).

This is not to say that complexity was the sole cause of the financial meltdown in 2007-09. Greed,
recklessness, incompetence, corruption, and misguided policies all played a role in making it happen.
The point here is that complexity was one of the key variables that linked many of these ever-present
factors in a way that created qualitatively new dynamics of risk in the financial system. See infra note
29.
13. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market's Payment Prioritiesas Financial Crisis
Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539 (2011); Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the
2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 1 (2011); Margaret M. Blair, Financial Innovation,
Leverage, Bubbles, and the DistributionofIncome, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225 (2010).
14. See R. STAFFORD JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION To DERIVATIVES: OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND
SWAPS 1-10 (2009).

15. See generally Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of
Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008) (examining the mechanism and
legal basis of securitization); Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012) (revisiting the definition of securitization).
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liquidity in the market.16 By the same token, however, these complex
financial instruments empowered market participants to engage in highly
sophisticated financial speculation and regulatory arbitrage that masked
excessive levels of leverage and risk, thereby threatening systemic
stability.' This crucial connection between increasing complexity and the
growth of socially undesirable speculative and arbitrage activities is one of
the key determinants of systemic risk in the financial sector.
Complex financial instruments are difficult to understand and value,
because their risks are not easily measured and controlled." This is
attributable to the potential complexity of the specific reference assets1 9
and the structure of the transactions. 20 Financial institutions use
sophisticated, proprietary mathematical models to establish values of
derivatives and structured instruments. 21 Although such models' accuracy
and reliability are inherently limited, their availability enables and
encourages financial engineering of even more complex financial
instruments. 22 Opacity and lack of reliable valuation create a heightened

16. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, More than Just "Aewt FinancialBingo": A Risk-Based
Approach to UnderstandingDerivatives, 23 J. COR-P. L. 1, 6 (1997); Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail
Sketch ofDerivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
17. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. FinancialServices Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 339-41
(2002). For an economic analysis of socially harmful effects of speculation and arbitrage, see Posner &
Weyl, supra note 9, at 8-10 (arguing that speculation enables socially-undesirable tax and regulatory
arbitrage by sophisticated investors, reduces welfare, and contributes to systemic risk).
18. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, MisunderstoodDerivatives: The Causes of InformationalFailure
and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1463 (1993) (arguing that
financial regulators cannot keep up with development of complex derivatives).
19. Pools of assets underlying a securitized transaction may contain loans with different
maturities, different interest rates, and different risk of prepayment or default. See Schwarcz, supra
note 4, at 217. Derivatives may reference even more complex "baskets" of synthetic exposure to
various risks.

20. For example, the terms of the financial instrument may establish complex payout schemes
and create additional linkages to other contracts between the same counterparties. See Schwarcz, supra
note 4, at 220.
21. See TURNER REVIEW, supranote 11, at 22. According to this report,
The very complexity of the mathematics used to measure and manage risk . . .made it
increasingly difficult for top management and boards to assess and exercise judgment over
the risks being taken. Mathematical sophistication ended up not containing risk, but providing
false assurance that other prima facie indicators of increasing risk (e.g., rapid credit extension
and balance sheet growth) could be safely ignored.
Id.
22. These models fundamentally depend on numerous assumptions that may not hold if
circumstances change, which happens during crises. Behavioral biases also explain the tendency
toward over-reliance on models. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The
Outsourcing of FinancialRegulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L.
REV. 127 (2009); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld, Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual
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danger of misleading or even defrauding market participants.23 This
informational asymmetry also creates an inherently unstable environment,
as market participants are more likely to over-invest in markets for such
instruments in good times and then flee them at the first sign of trouble,
24
triggering old-fashioned investor panics and creditor runs.
Markets for trading such instruments are themselves increasingly
complex, with many different market participants connected through an
intricate network of direct contractual links and indirect common exposure
to risks.2 5 Complex structured transactions effectively separate and
repackage ownership, payment, and other rights associated with the
reference assets. 26 This, in turn, reduces transparency and flexibility in
these markets, leading to greater systemic risk and instability. 2 7 As a result
of this complexity, opacity, interconnectedness, and fragmentation,
individual financial institutions lack the ability to measure and analyze not
only the overall pattern of risk distribution in the financial system, but also
the true level of their own risk exposure. 28 Importantly, they can also
purposely obscure risk from regulators' view. Thus, complexity remains
"the greatest financial-market challenge of the future."2 9

Biases in Complex OrganizationsContributed to the Crisis of 2008, 33 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLY 807
(2010).
23. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 221-29.
24. See, e.g., Gorton, supra note 3; DARRELL DUFFIE, How BIG BANKS FAIL AND WHAT To Do
ABOUT IT (2011).
25. See GROUP OF THIRTY, ENHANCING FINANCIAL STABILITY AND RESILIENCE:
MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY, TOOLS, AND SYSTEMS FOR THE FUTURE 22 23 (2010), available at

http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Macroprudential

Report Final.pdf; Schwarcz, supra note 4, at

233-35.

26. See Judge, supra note 12; David A. Dana, The ForeclosureCrisis and the Antifragmentation
Principle of State Property Law, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (2010) (arguing that the complex, multilayered structure of mortgage securitization created excessive fragmentation of property interests,
which caused the mortgage crisis and impedes its resolution). The argument that excessive complexity
of financial products may violate some of the basic principles of state property law, including the rule
against unreasonable restraints on alienation of property interests, provides a potentially powerful
alternative basis for advocating ex ante regulatory controls on product development. I owe this insight
to Professor Heather Hughes.
27. See Judge, supranote 12.
28. See Awrey, supra note 4; Utset, supra note 4; Judge, supra note 12.
29. Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 213. Some may argue that the role of complexity in bringing
about the latest financial crisis is exaggerated and that the regulators understood the problems and had
the proper tools to remedy them but chose not to take the necessary action. This is a valid argument,
especially with respect to federal bank regulators' refusal to stop abusive mortgage lending practices
or the SEC's failure to police instances of improper disclosure or conflict of interest. However, it tends
to understate the significance of regulatory and jurisdictional gaps created by the emergence of
complex financial instruments. For example, no federal regulatory agency had direct authority to
regulate OTC derivatives markets. Moreover, systemic risk is often not connected to fraud or other
illegal conduct. This argument also misses the crucial link between the explosive growth of risk in
"simple" asset categories (such as mortgage loans) and the demand for such risk from institutions that
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It is important to emphasize that both complexity and financial
innovation are normatively neutral concepts. Complex and innovative
financial instruments, activities, and interrelationships are neither
inherently harmful nor invariably beneficial. They make the financial
system less stable and more prone to shocks, but also enable it to develop
and adjust to new circumstances. The prevailing economic theory tends to
over-emphasize the positive role of financial innovation as "a rational
demand-driven response to market imperfections." 30 That explanation,
however, ignores what Dan Awrey calls "supply-side incentives" of
financial intermediaries-dealers and market-makers-to continue
creating complex financial products, not in response to natural market
demand, but in order to generate short-term, monopoly-like rents. 3 1
The typical narrative of various market participants' interactions as
"buyers" and "sellers" in an individual transaction often obscures the
central role of dealers in generating complexity and systemic risk. Dealers
are essential players in the markets for derivatives and structured products:
they design complex instruments offering various combinations of
financial risk and return, and market them to clients by taking either side
of the transaction. Dealers build large portfolios of positions in various
instruments and hedge their risks by entering into trades with other clients
or, more commonly, other dealers. Thus, it is the dealer institutions that
create, distribute, and maintain markets in financial risk, expand linkages
among market participants, and multiply potential channels of contagion
in the financial system.
Financial intermediaries do not typically enjoy legal monopoly rightsthrough patent protection or otherwise-on their innovative products,
which can be reverse-engineered and reproduced by their competitors.
Dealers derive the highest profits from being the first to design and sell a
new financial instrument that is perceived as offering some unique
benefits to investors, mostly by enhancing their ability to engage in
speculation and arbitrage, and therefore commands a high premium. Once
a new product becomes commoditized, the original dealer loses its ability
to extract monopolistic rents and seeks to introduce the next innovation to

structured and invested in complex financial instruments referencing such assets. See THE LEvIN
REPORT, supra note 11, at 17 25.
30. Awrey, supranote 4, at 30.
31. Id. at 32-37. Highlighting the intimate link between financial innovation and complexity,
Awrey notes, "It is in their quest to maximize and exploit their superior tolerance for complexity that
financial intermediaries have driven us toward and perhaps even beyond-the complexity frontier."
Id. at 39.
32. Id.
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recapture lost rents. 33 Modem technology enables financial institutions to
artificially accelerate the pace of this "socially useless" over-innovation. 4
A direct result of this strategy is constant introduction of new complex
financial instruments into the market, even in the absence of any "natural"
demand for such instruments-a phenomenon best described as strategic
complexity.3 5 According to one influential study,
[I]t seems likely that some and perhaps much of the structuring and
trading activity involved in the complex version of securitized
credit, was not required to deliver credit intermediation efficiently.
Instead, it achieved an economic rent extraction made possible by
the opacity of margins, the asymmetry of information and
knowledge between end users of financial services and producers,
and the structure of the principal/agent relationships between
investors and companies and between companies and individual
136
employees.
Understanding these dynamics is the key to developing an informed
and pragmatic normative basis for managing complexity in the financial
system. Whether the increasing complexity of financial products and
activities is beneficial to society depends ultimately on what they are used
for and how they affect-intentionally or unintentionally-not only
individual firms and financial markets, but also broader social and
economic policies and values. Similarly, an optimal or desirable level of
innovation and complexity in financial markets is relative to society's
capacity to manage and regulate risks associated with these phenomena.
The key challenge, therefore, is to develop a mechanism for determining
which innovative financial instruments and transactions offer economic

33. Id. at 34-35. As Awrey describes it,
This strategy does not necessarily rely on the existence of any natural demand in the
marketplace, nor on the innovation itself being "new" in any material respect. Rather, it can
theoretically be premised on little more than, inter alia, capitalizing on investor shorttermism, other behavioral factures, or simply tapping the innate human desire for the "next
new thing." The practical effect of this strategy is to reset the diffusion clock-in essence
creating more (albeit shorter) monopoly-like periods-thereby enabling intermediaries to
extract greater rents from their innovations.
Id. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted).
34. Id. at 38 (quoting Adair Turner, Chairman of the U.K. Financial Services Authority).
35. For an insightful analysis of this phenomenon in the mortgage finance market, see Adam J.
Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explainingthe Housing Bubble, 100 GEo L.J. 1177 (2012) (arguing that
the main "supply-side" cause of the recent crisis was the growth of unregulated private securitization
market in which financial institutions exploited complexity to misprice credit risk).
36. TURNER REVIEW, supranote 11, at 49.
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and social benefits that outweigh potential increases in systemic risk and
strategic complexity in financial markets.
The recent crisis underscored the reasons for not relying primarily on
private actors in financial markets to make these types of measured and
socially responsible determinations. It exposed the dangers of keeping
naYve faith in the "natural" alignment between private actors' rational selfinterest and the broader public interests in preserving systemic stability,
especially in the context of today's complex and inherently unstable
financial markets .3

Several factors explain the inability of private financial institutions to
effectively manage systemic risk associated with complexity. As
influential behavioral finance studies show, various cognitive biases
increase the chances of presumably rational actors making irrational
- 40choices.
In an increasingly complex and uncertain environment,
individuals and organizations tend to rely heavily on heuristic devices that
produce sub-optimal results.41 Even setting aside the role of behavioral
biases, the crisis experience demonstrated how the inherent logic of
financial-market rationality, without corrective government intervention,
leads to instability and systemic failure. 42 Private profit-seeking enterprises

37. According to one study,
The alternative [to current incremental approach to reforms] is to challenge, rather than take
as inevitable, a complex, integrated, and securitized system of finance, and to consider
possibilities for redesigning financial infrastructures themselves. If we take seriously the
notion that regulation constitutes markets, rather than merely intervening in markets "after the
fact," then the current moment becomes an opportunity to rethink market architecture, in light
of the problems of complexity and tight coupling.
Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Regulating or Redesigning Finance? Market Architectures, Normal
Accidents, and Dilemmas of Regulatory Reform, RESEARCH IN SOCIOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 281,

283 (M. Lounsbury & P. Hirsh eds., 2010).
38. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Toiards an Analytical
Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1349 (2011).

39. One of the most revealing moments in this respect came in October 2008, when the former
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the "Federal Reserve"), Alan
Greenspan, publicly admitted that he had erred in putting too much faith in the self-correcting powers
of free markets. See Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2008, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html.
40. Scholars in behavioral finance offer sophisticated theoretical accounts of such biases, or
heuristic devices commonly used by market actors as short cuts for their decision-making. See, e.g.,
ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); BEHAVIORAL LAW &
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).

41. See, e.g., Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 22; Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased
Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial
Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REv. 1209 (2011).
42.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE

DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009) (discussing the causes of the recent financial crisis and arguing that
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rationally act in a self-regarding manner when assessing and taking risks.
They do not internalize the spillover effects of such selfish risk-taking,
which are particularly dangerous in the context of today's interconnected
financial markets.43 As Professors Anabtawi and Schwarcz conclude, this
"tragedy of the commons suggests that, absent intervention, financial
market participants will progressively pursue their self-interest in the form
of socially excessive risk-taking."44 Finally, the recent crisis provided
numerous examples of private market participants intentionally acting
with reckless disregard for potentially harmful effects of their conduct on
their counterparties or the broader economy.45 The opacity and complexity
of financial products amplified the ability of financial institutions to profit
from this type of socially destructive behavior and, at the same time, made
it more difficult to hold them legally accountable for it.46
As private market participants lack the capacity and the incentives to
solve the fundamental tension between private and public costs and
benefits of financial innovation and increasing complexity, developing a
mechanism for balancing these factors becomes a task primarily for
lawmakers and regulators.
B. Regulating Complexity
How to regulate complexity that results from financial innovation is a
vexing question, both in practice and in theory. The recent crisis was not
only a systemic market failure, but also a systemic regulatory failure.4 In
the wake of the crisis, policymakers and academics face the challenge of
reassessing the pre-crisis regulatory philosophy and articulating a new set
of principles for redefining the public-private balance in financial services
regulation.

rational profit-maximizing behavior of market actors produces negative externalities that cannot be
controlled without government regulation); See also Utset, supra note 4.
43. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 38, at 1374-76.
44. Id. at 1375.
45. For detailed case studies of such behavior, see THE LEvIN REPORT, supra note 11. See also
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning A Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory
Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2041-42 (2007) (arguing that securitization enabled predatory
lending and growth of subprime mortgage markets).
46. See, e.g., THE LEVIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 318-636 (detailing the instances of abusive
market conduct by Deutsche Bank and Goldman Sachs).
47. See generally FN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 11 (concluding that various federal
regulatory agencies' failure to exercise proper oversight of financial institutions and markets was a
major contributing factor behind the crisis).
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1. From Greenspan to Dodd-Frank: Regulatory Responses to
Complexity
For decades before the recent financial crisis, the so-called "Greenspan
doctrine" was the dominant ideology underlying and guiding regulatory
developments in the U.S. financial services sector.48 Driven by an
unwavering faith in the supremacy and self-regulatory wisdom of free
markets, the Greenspan doctrine held that all financial innovation was an
unqualified public good, that complex financial instruments always
transferred risk to those "who were better able to bear it," and that
unregulated hedge funds and other speculators were indispensable and
benign sources of liquidity in financial markets. 49 Accordingly, under this
ideological creed, the goal of regulation was, quite simply, to not interfere
with the victorious march of financial innovation. 0
Regulatory agencies dealt with the growing informational asymmetry
with respect to complex financial instruments by relying increasingly on
the financial services industry's internal capacity to identify, measure, and
control the risks arising out of its business activities. The concept of "risk
management" on an individual-entity level became the cornerstone of the
regulatory approach used to accommodate the increasing complexity of
financial products and the institutions that created and traded them.51
Regulators viewed individual enterprise-wide risk management as the
principal tool for maintaining system-wide financial stability.52 This
approach essentially rejected the validity of imposing limits on private

48. This neoliberal ideological creed, as applied to financial services regulation, was named after
Alan Greenspan, the former Chairman of the Federal Reserve and the "Maestro" of financial markets,
who was its most influential proponent. See JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 7, at 100-04 (describing
Greenspan's beliefs and ideological influence).
49. See Cristie Ford, Macro and Micro Level Effects on Responsive FinancialRegulation, 44
U.B.C. L. REV. 589, 612 (2011) ("[T]he prevailing assumption in the years leading up to the financial
crisis was that all innovation was by definition beneficial, because unsound ideas would be winnowed
out by market forces.")
50. Id.
51. In the pre-crisis decade, the concept of Enterprise Risk Management ("ERM") dominated the
discussions among industry experts, academics, and policy makers. See generally NEIL DOHERTY,
INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT

(2000); JAMES

LAM, ENTERPRISE

RISK MANAGEMENT:

FROM

INCENTIVES TO CONTROL (2003); DAVID L. OLSON & DESHENG Wu, NEw FRONTIERS IN ENTERPRISE

RISK MANAGEMENT (2008).

52. One example of this approach is capital adequacy regulation, which ties financial institutions'
leverage to the riskiness of their assets and is widely viewed as the cornerstone of prudential
regulation. For a description of the international framework of capital adequacy regulation, see HAL S.
SCOTT & ANNA GELPERN, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:

412 73 (18th ed. 2011).

TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND REGULATION
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actors' risk-taking, instead tying the levels of socially acceptable risk to
financial market participants' ability to manage such risk internally. This
approach, however, had two fundamental flaws. First, it significantly
overestimated the ability and, more importantly, the incentives of financial
institutions to manage risk, especially in the face of high uncertainty and
54
potential profitability of risky activities. Second, it incorrectly assumed a
direct link between firm-level risk management and system-wide
stability.55
The centerpiece of the post-crisis U.S. reform legislation, the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the
"Dodd-Frank Act"), 5 6 explicitly focuses on systemic risk regulation.
Despite the ambitious sweep of the envisioned reforms, however, the
Dodd-Frank Act falls short of offering a new approach to regulating
complexity. The new law seeks to control systemic risk primarily through
an array of familiar measures, including restructuring and creating new
regulatory agencies, mandating a significantly greater amount of
information to be disclosed by market participants, enhancing capital
requirements for certain institutions or activities, extending the
jurisdictional reach of financial regulators to a wider universe of entities,
and shoring up the market infrastructure. Whether the voluminous
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act will ultimately have a significant
practical impact depends greatly on their implementation by the regulatory
agencies. It is clear, however, that the Dodd-Frank Act does not offer any
direct solution to the fundamental dilemma of how to reduce and control
complexity and interconnectedness in financial markets.
The Dodd-Frank Act's provisions dealing with regulation of OTC
derivatives illustrate this approach. The statute mandates, subject to some
exceptions, central clearing of standardized derivatives through regulated
clearing organizations and trading through either regulated exchanges or
so-called swap execution facilities. It also introduces new regulatory

53. Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Business of
Banking", 63 MIAMI L. REv. 1041, 1107 (2009).
54. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g, Eric J. Pan, Understanding Financial Regulation 43 (Cardozo Legal Studies
Working Paper No. 329, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=180
5018 ("Regulators cannot expect that private actors will be capable of identifying how the actions of
individual firms may make the financial system less stable.").
56. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 2011)).
57. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-74 (West Supp. 2011).
58. 12 U.S.C.A. § 723 (West Supp. 2011).
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categories of financial actors: swap dealers and major swap participants.5 9
The Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") and the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") share oversight of OTC
derivatives markets in a manner largely consistent with the historical
jurisdictional divisions between these agencies. 60 Market participants must
report swap transactions to regulators and special data repositories, while
the SEC and CFTC are required to adopt rules on real-time public data
reporting of swap transactions. 6 1 The new law also requires the regulators
to develop business conduct rules for swap dealers and major swap
participants, as well as special capital and margin rules for various types of
swaps.62 The Act does not, however, directly aim to lower the level of risk
or complexity present in the OTC derivatives market. While encouraging
standardization of derivatives products, the law exempts individually
tailored, or "bespoke," instruments-which are most likely to be highly
complex and risky-from the mandatory exchange trading and central
clearing. Ultimately, the statute fails to articulate a fundamental principle
for balancing the benefits of increasingly complex derivatives transactions
and markets against their potential risks to long-term financial and
economic stability. 64
2. From Economic to Risk Regulation:PotentialAlternatives in the
Academic Debate
The recent crisis underscored the lack of a conceptual framework for
regulating complexity and systemic risk in the financial services sector
and reignited scholarly debate on the proper scope and objectives of
financial regulation reform.

59. 12 U.S.C.A.

§ 731

(West Supp. 2011).

60. See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL, LLP, SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET

REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, ENACTED INTO LAW ON JULY 21, 2010, at 52 (2010),
available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/7084f9fe-6580-413b-b870-b7cO25ed2ecf/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1d4495c7-0be0-4e9a-ba77-f786fb90464a/070910 Financial Reform
Summary.pdf
61. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 727-30 (West Supp. 2011).
62. 12 U.S.C.A. § 719 (West Supp. 2011).
63. 12 U.S.C.A. § 763 (West Supp. 2011). In a somewhat confusing manner, the Dodd-Frank Act
contains provisions authorizing some form of pre-market review of securities futures and "novel
derivative products." 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 717-18 (West Supp. 2011). These provisions, however, establish
the process for clarifying the jurisdictional lines between SEC and CFTC with respect to products that
combine elements of securities and commodity futures. Although it is not clear how these provisions
will be implemented in practice, the language of the Act itself does not mandate substantive preapproval of complex derivatives.
64. See Saule T. Omarova, The Dodd-FrankAct: A Aew DealforA Aew Age?, 15 N.C. BANKING
INST. 83 (2011).
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Broadly, there are three interrelated approaches to theorizing
regulation. 5 The first approach focuses on the rationale and the goals of
regulation (normative theories of regulation); the second approach focuses
on the process and efficacy of regulation (theories of regulatory design); 66
and the third approach focuses on the origins and political basis of
regulatory choices (theories of political economy of regulation). 7 From a
normative perspective, it is possible to draw broad distinctions among
three types of regulation:68 (1) economic regulation aimed primarily at
correcting specific market inefficiencies in order to enable the frictionless
operation of free market forces; 69 (2) social regulation that seeks to
allocate economic and political rights in accordance with broader societal
values and norms; and (3) risk regulation seeking to protect society from
significant and potentially catastrophic risks. While, in reality, these
three types of regulation operate along a continuum, the relative salience
of normative claims along that continuum often signifies a fundamental
shift in the nature of the regulatory regime. .73

65.

Elsewhere, these three approaches were referred to as the Public Interest, Public

Administration, and Public Choice perspectives, respectively. See JEFFREY L. HARRISON ET AL.,
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 19-39 (2d ed. 2004).

66. For a classic example of this approach, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
67. Various versions of the public choice analysis fall in this category. See George J. Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. ScI. 3 (1971); BARRY M. MITNICK, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING, DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS
(1980); ROGER G. NOLL & BRUCE M. OWEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEREGULATION: INTEREST
GROUPS IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS (1983); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND
PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).
68. These three categories are not mutually exclusive. In reality, many forms of regulation pursue
complex policy objectives and have significant implications in all three areas. This grouping is meant
as an analytical roadmap for situating the proposal advanced in this Article in the broader academic
debate on financial regulation reform.
69. For a classic analysis of economic regulation, see STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM (1982).
70. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997).
71. This category includes, most notably, environmental, health, and safety regulation. See Julia
Black, The Role of Risk in Regulatory Processes, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF REGULATION 302,
305-06 (Robert Baldwin et al. eds., 2010).
72. In some fundamental sense, all regulation aims to control some form of risk. For a thorough
and nuanced discussion of the role of risk in regulation, see Black, supra note 71.
73. According to Julia Black,
[N]ot all regulation is described as being about "risk". The regulators of water, rail,

telecommunications, competition, and energy are typically referred to by policy makers and
academics not as "risk" regulators but as "economic" regulators. These economic regulators
are the archetypal "regulatory state" regulators .... established to regulate liberalised markets
in the 1980s and 1990s across a wide range of countries. In accordance with the canons of

economic liberalism, the object of regulation for those regulators is defined in terms of the
market, and regulation is justified principally in terms of its role in correcting market failures:
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Before the latest crisis, financial services regulation was generally
viewed as just another case of economic regulation whose primary goal
was to correct market inefficiencies (such as informational asymmetries,
monopolistic tendencies, or agency problems), minimize the possibility of
market failure (such as infamous bank runs), but otherwise to not impose
excessive costs on, or interfere with the proper functioning of, private
financial markets. 4 Disclosure requirements of federal securities laws,
federal deposit insurance and access to the lender of last resort for
depository
institutions,
conflict-of-interest
rules
for financial
intermediaries, and prudential regulation of banking institutions are
examples of such corrective regulatory mechanisms targeting specific
problems in the operation of free market forces.
The crisis of 2007-09, however, exposed the growing saliency of
policy objectives associated with the risk-regulation model. While
correcting specific market inefficiencies and allowing free-market
mechanisms to work remains an important regulatory goal, it is now clear
that government regulation has to protect the national (and, ultimately,
global) economy and citizenry from potentially catastrophic consequences
of financial market failure. Prioritizing systemic financial and economic
stability over market participants' freedom to pursue private gain makes
financial services regulation more fundamentally similar to regulatory
systems aimed at protection of human health, safety, and environment.
The post-crisis pragmatic imperative, thus, necessitates a shift in the
underlying paradigm of financial services regulation.
To date, however, such a shift has not been fully conceptualized, as the
academic community struggles to reconcile the new post-crisis emphasis
on risk regulation with the powerful traditional focus on pure market
efficiency. The pre-crisis normative assumptions regarding the limits of
government intervention in financial markets continue to shape the

monopolies, barriers to entry or exit, externalities, information asymmetries, or principalagent problems.
Id. at 305 (internal citations omitted).
74. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 11, at 39 ("The predominant assumption behind financial
market regulation-in the US, the UK and increasingly around the world-has been that financial
markets are capable of being both efficient and rational and that a key goal of financial market
regulation is to remove the impediments which might produce inefficient and illiquid markets.")
75. U.S. banking law has strong elements of risk regulation, insofar as it seeks to prevent
systemic effects of bank failure and to safeguard the federal deposit insurance fund. Nevertheless, the
U.S. system of bank regulation and supervision focuses primarily on protecting the safety and
soundness of individual deposit-taking institutions by addressing their inherent vulnerability to runs. In
that sense, it remains essentially a form of economic regulation.
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ongoing debate on how to make those markets less dangerous not only to
market participants, but also to citizenry at large.
The majority of current reform proposals continue to rely primarily on
market-based solutions to the problem of systemic risk caused by
increasing complexity of financial products and markets. These solutions
generally aim at creating incentives for individual firms, their agents, and
various gatekeepers to act in a more informed, rational, and efficient way,
which is expected to reduce the risk to both the individual firms' own
financial health and the financial system as a whole. In effect, they pursue
the familiar objective of eliminating specific inefficiencies that distort
market dynamics. Examples of such proposed measures include enhanced
76
disclosure of financial and transactional data, strengthened corporate
governance and changes in executive compensation at financial firms,
heightened capital requirements, improving the quality and reliability of
- 79
8
credit ratings,
creation of contingent capital instruments,80
and even tying
regulators' compensation to performance of regulated financial
institutions." Scholars also focus on strengthening and improving the
existing mechanisms of regulation and supervision in the financial services
sector. Some of the proposed measures include tougher regulation of credit
rating agencies' rating -processes, 82- extending regulatory oversight to nonbank financial actors operating in the so-called shadow banking system,83

76. See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, Loan-Level Disclosure in Securitization Transactions: A
Problem with Three Dimensions (Harv. Law School Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 10-40, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=1649657
(arguing for mandating public disclosure of loan-level information in securitizations).
77. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247
(2010); Frederick Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensationfor Risk
Regulation, 105 Nw. U. L. REv. 1205 (2010).
78. See, e.g., Hal S. Scott, The Reduction ofSystemic Risk in the United States FinancialSystem,
33 HARVARD J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671 (2010).
79. See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Credit Rating Agencies and the "Worldide CreditCrisis ": The
Limits of Reputation, the Insufficiency of Reform, and the Proposalfor Improvement, 2009 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 109 (2009); Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee
ApproachforRating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011 (2009).
80. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capitaland the
Needfor Regulatory Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (2011).
81. Frederick Tung & M. Todd Henderson, Payfor Regulator Performance(U. Chi. L. & Econ.,
Olin Working Paper No. 574, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstract id=
1916310.
82. See, e.g., Hunt, supra note 79; Manns, supra note 79; Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation
of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor Perspective 3 (2009), available at http:/www.cii
.org/userfiles/file/CRAWhitepaperO4-14-09.pdf.
83. See, e.g., Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Designfor Monetary Stability (Harv. John M. Olin
Ctr. for L. Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 706, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=1933890.
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and eliminating the preferential treatment of derivatives contracts under
federal bankruptcy laws.84 Finally, a few proposals offer more radical
structural solutions, such as breaking up financial institutions that are "too
big to fail.""
While these proposals contain valuable insights into important issues in
financial regulation reform, they generally offer only partial solutions to
the problem of systemic risk control. Discrete reform measures are likely
to work only if they are part of a broader strategic process. More
importantly, the tools and methods of traditional "economic" regulation of
financial services, such as disclosure or use of contingent capital
instruments, are likely to do little to resolve the more fundamental
problems posed by the increasing complexity and interconnectedness in
the financial system. 86
A different strand in the academic debate shifts focus to the process of
regulation itself. Building on basic insights from behavioral finance,"
New Governance theories,88 and the concept of responsive regulation, 89
scholars engaged in this conversation on regulatory design generally
advocate a more self-reflexive, dialogic, iterative regulatory process that is
better able to adapt to the complex and dynamic reality of financial
markets.90 This approach rejects unquestioning reliance on market
mechanisms, but at the same time is skeptical of static "command-andcontrol" solutions to the problem of systemic risk prevention. Despite the
differences in their methodological and normative arguments, these
scholars explicitly acknowledge complexity as the central challenge for

84. See Roe, supra note 13.
85. See, e.g, Jonathan R. Macey & James P. Holdcroft, Jr., Failure Is an Option: An ErsatzAntitrust Approach to FinancialRegulation, 120 YALE L.J. 1368 (2011); JOHNSON & KWAK, supra
note 7.

86. See supra Part L.A. The crisis clearly exposed the limits of mandatory disclosure as the
remedy for market inefficiencies caused by excessive complexity of financial products and structures.
See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 35 (discussing the pernicious effects of informational opacity in
complex securitizations). The risk-regulation paradigm acknowledges the limits of disclosure even
more explicitly. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 338 ("Information may be an inadequate
strategy when greater safety is a public good.").
87. See supra note 40.
88. For an overview of the New Governance theories, see Orly Lobel, The Renewv Deal: The Fall
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REv. 342
(2004). See also Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance:A Cross-DisciplinaryReview of Current
Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REv. 1 (2008); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and
Principles-BasedSecuritiesRegulation, 45 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 27 28 (2008).
89. See AYREs & BRAITHWAITE, supranote 66, at ch. 3.

90. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 49 (advocating a shift toward "meta-regulation" as a more iterative
and reflexive regulatory model that focuses regulators' attention on the unknown).

2012]

LICENSE TO DEAL

83

effective regulation and search for regulatory design solutions to that
challenge. 91
This promising line of research highlights a critically important set of
issues in regulatory reform. It is hard to deny that effective regulation of
complex financial markets is itself a complex undertaking. Designing and
implementing a dynamic and self-reflexive regulatory system is likely to
be a long, difficult, and politically complicated process. In the meantime,
however, it is necessary to address the increasing incongruity between
financial services markets and financial services regulation. It stands to
reason that until we are able to establish a sufficiently sophisticated and
adaptive regulatory system, the only practical solution to this dilemma is
trying to control, and even reduce, the level of complexity in the financial
markets.
Reconceptualizing financial services regulation as a form of risk
regulation rather than purely economic regulation broadens our normative
perspective and expands the range of potential methods of decisionmaking. Thus, one of the central themes in risk regulation is how to
operationalize precaution in making regulatory choices. One method of
expressing this broad norm of precaution is the so-called precautionary
principle that "emphasize[s] anticipation of harm and taking preventive
measures in the face of uncertainty.

."9

Various formulations of the

precautionary principle differ in the degree of presumptive risk-aversion.93
Generally, the strong version of the principle (1) creates a presumption
that regulatory action is necessary whenever a private activity potentially
poses serious risks to important public interests, even in the absence of
scientific certainty with respect to the nature or extent of such risks; and
(2) explicitly places the burden on the private proponent of the riskcreating activity to overcome the default by proving that risks are
acceptable or reasonable.94
The implementation of the precautionary principle involves highly
politicized and contestable policy choices. 95 Not surprisingly, the

91. See, e.g., Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV.
1629 (2011); Miller & Rosenfeld, supra note 22.
92. Noah Sachs, Rescuing the Strong PrecautionaryPrinciple From its Critics, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1285, 1295 (2011).

93. See id at 1292-95 (distinguishing between the weak and strong forms of the principle);
Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1513-18 (Dennis T. Paustenbach ed., 2002) (discussing

three versions of the precautionary principle).
94. Sachs, supra note 92, at 1295.
95. See Black, supra note 72, at 319-21.
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precautionary principle is a controversial matter and its practical efficacy
is a subject of continuing debate and criticism.96 It is not the goal of this
Article to advocate direct application of any particular formulation of
precautionary principle to financial services regulation. Nevertheless,
adopting and operationalizing the general concept of precaution in the
context of post-crisis financial systemic risk regulation may be a
worthwhile, and even necessary, exercise.
C. The Concept ofProductApproval Regulation
This Article argues that one potentially effective method of
operationalizing the concept of precaution in financial services regulation
is to introduce a system of mandatory government licensing of complex
financial products. Requiring regulatory pre-approval of financial products
can function as a gatekeeping mechanism designed to discourage and
reduce socially unproductive strategic complexity of financial instruments
and markets and impose dynamic controls on the process of financial
innovation. This regime would explicitly adopt an anticipatory approach to
managing systemic risk and shift the burden of meeting the standards for
approval to the financial institutions. By reducing the complexity and
systemic vulnerabilities it creates, this model is likely to enhance the
efficiency and integrity of financial markets. Thus, if successful, a system
of mandatory pre-approval of complex financial products could serve as a
hybrid regulatory model based on pragmatic considerations of precaution
and efficiency.
Professors Daniel Carpenter and Michael Ting define "approval
regulation" as a regime in which "government entities exercise discretion
over whether the firm or product can enter the market, such that firms
must make an empirical case for admission that the regulator must accept
if legal market entry is to be granted." 9 Two key elements-regulatory
discretion with respect to granting approval and a built-in "proof'
requirement9 8-distinguish this form of regulation from Breyer's classic
definition of "regulation of entry" that typically sets forth purely

96. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005);

Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1003 (2003); THE REALITY
OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE (Jonathan B.

Wiener et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION].

97. Daniel Carpenter & Michael M. Ting, A Theory of Approval Regulation 2 (Feb. 10, 2004)
(manuscript).
98. Id. at 2 n.1.

2012]

LICENSE TO DEAL

85

procedural conditions on market entry, such as licensing fees. 99 In the
approval regulation system, "the state acts as a discretionary market
gatekeeper and potential entrants provide not a fee but a proof of quality or
necessity."1oo
The idea of extending approval regulation to financial products became
a subject of academic discussion in 2008-09, in the context of the debate
on the creation of a new financial consumer protection agency. In 2008,
Professors Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill published a proposal to
create a Financial Product Safety Commission ("FPSC") with a broad
mandate to ensure that financial products sold to consumers meet certain
safety standards, in a manner similar to the Consumer Product Safety
Commission's monitoring of safety of tangible consumer products.101 In
many respects, Warren and Bar-Gill's proposal was similar to the familiar
model of a "market conduct regulator" proposed earlier by the Treasury
Department.10 2 By framing the issue as one of safety of financial products
for consumers, however, their proposal effectively shifted the debate into
the realm of risk regulation and democratic politics, as opposed to purely
technocratic solutions to market inefficiencies.
Other scholars elaborated on the FPSC concept and advanced their own
versions of what the commission could and should do.10 3 Professor
Carpenter proposed a model of an FPSC with broad ex ante approval
power over consumer financial products, similar to the FDA. 104 Under his
proposal, the commission would have a "veto power over market entry"
for consumer financial products, based on the "experimental or quasiexperimental evidence" of the products' safety, quality, and efficacy.105
Such evidence, for example, could come from the observable results of a

99. See BREYER, supra note 69.
100. Carpenter & Ting, supra note 97, at 2.
101. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren,Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2008).
102. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE (2008); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREAS., FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEw
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), available at http:/
www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport web.pdf.
103. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007/2008 AND ITS MACROECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES 29-30 (2009), available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/izstiglitz/download/
papers/2008_Financial Crisis.pdf; Daniel Carpenter, Particulars of a Financial Product Safety
Commission, in THE TOBIN PROJECT, CONSIDERING A FINANCIAL PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION 8
(May 2009).
104. Carpenter, supranote 103, at 9-10.
105. Id. at 9. Professor Stiglitz emphasized that the FPSC had to ensure that all financial products
had a bona fide risk management purpose and were proven to achieve that stated objective. Stiglitz,

supranote 103, at 29.
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limited product roll-out or modeling and simulations.1 06 According to
Carpenter, information generated as a result of pre-approval
experimentation would improve consumers' ability to make an informed
choice and increase consumer confidence in the financial markets. This in
turn would strengthen the demand for financial products deemed to be safe
for consumers. 107 By standardizing and collecting such information, the
proposed FPSC would, in effect, improve market efficiency.10 8
Later, Carpenter proposed a modified version of the financial product
approval process, based on the file-and-use system similar to that adopted
in the insurance industry. 109 Under that model, every originator would be

required to file a notice of intent with the FPSC to introduce a new
"safety-regulated retail financial product," including mortgages, payday
loans, and credit cards. 110 The filing would include a marketing plan and a
mandatory schedule for experimental data collection. The FPSC would
have 180 days to review the notice and stop the roll-out of the product if it
found evidence that the product posed potential danger to consumers. If
the commission failed to act within that period, the originator would be
free to distribute the product. To ensure the reliability and fairness of the
process, Carpenter emphasized the importance of public scrutiny of the
products. He proposed appointing an advisory committee consisting of
academics and stakeholder representatives, and ensuring public
availability of the experimentation data and other pertinent product
information. These procedural features of the model were meant to
enhance the essential confidence-building function of the consumer
financial product approval scheme."'
In 2009, several bills proposing the creation of the FPSC were
introduced in both the Senate and the House. After an intense political
struggle, the Dodd-Frank Act created the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection ("CFPB") within the Federal Reserve, charged with exercising
consistent and unified oversight of the implementation of federal financial
consumer protection laws.1 12 The CFPB, however, does not have explicit

106. Carpenter, supra note 103, at 9.
107. Daniel Carpenter et al., Approval Regulation and the Endogenous Provision of Confidence:
Theory and an Analogy between Financial and Safety Regulation (Oct.26, 2009) (manuscript).
108. See Daniel Carpenter et al., Proposal for a Financial Product Approval Process with Modified
File-and-Use Elements, Public Scrutiny, and Commitment Experimentation (June 10, 2009)
(manuscript).
109. Id. at 1.
110. Id. at4.
Ill. Id. at2.
112. The Dodd-Frank Act, Title X, Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 11203, 124 Stat. 1955 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
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authority to review and approve any consumer financial product before it
enters the market. Thus, despite the undeniable influence of the FPSC
debate on the legislative process, the Dodd-Frank Act did not create a
system of approval regulation with respect to consumer financial
products.' 13

The debate on the FPSC focused primarily on consumer financial
services and framed the key issues in terms of consumer protection.
Professors Eric Posner and Glen Weyl recently proposed what they called
an "FDA for Financial Innovation" approach aimed specifically at limiting
speculation in derivatives.1 14 Under their proposal, a government agency
would have to approve all new financial products-most clearly,
derivatives-for marketing and trading only if such products pass a "social
utility" test that "focuses on whether the product will likely be used more
often for hedging than for speculation."'" Posner and Weyl argue that
their approach would revive the common-law doctrine of insurable
interest, which helped to limit financial speculation before the
deregulatory changes in the 1990s unleashed its dangerous potential.' 16
Although their proposal shifts the focus to product approval as a form of
systemic risk regulation, it identifies and targets one specific source of
systemic risk in financial markets-"the welfare-reducing effects of
speculation on the speculators themselves."' 17 In effect, their article offers
a traditional economic argument for introducing a speculation-curbing
product approval scheme, but does not address specific details of
regulatory design. 18
According to Posner and Weyl, financial products are fundamentally
similar to pharmaceutical drugs and, therefore, should be subject to
similarly rigorous controls." 9 First, a full evaluation of the risks and
benefits of financial products generally requires professional expertise that

113. Interestingly, the U.K. financial regulators appear to be moving toward instituting a product
approval regime as a more effective and deliberately interventionist form of consumer protection.
Thus, in early 2011, the UK FSA published a discussion paper proposing targeted reviews of specific
financial instruments used by retail customers-including deposits, insurance policies, mortgages, and
investment products-at an early stage of product design and marketing. See UNITED KINGDOM'S FN.
SERV. AUTHORITY, DISCUSSION PAPER: PRODUCT INTERVENTION, DP 11/1 (Jan. 2011), available at

http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dpll 01.pdf
114. See Posner & Weyl, supra note 9.
115. Id. at 2. Posner and Weyl discuss additional factors that regulators would have to consider,
but only if the quantitative market demand analysis does not produce an unambiguous answer. Id at
15-17.
116. Id. at 5.
117. Id. at 6.
118. See id. at 35.
119. Id. at 36-38.
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most investors and consumers do not possess. Relying on nonprofessionals' subjective preferences is not likely to produce optimal
results. 120 Second, financial decisions tend to have delayed and uncertain
feedback, which reduces individuals' ability to correct their mistakes
promptly.' 2 ' Finally, as the latest crisis demonstrated, the extent of
potential harm that financial market failure may cause not only to
individuals, but to society as a whole necessitates a more intrusive ex ante
approach to financial regulation.122
To this list, one can add the importance of public perceptions-not
only of the extent of potential systemic risk in financial markets, but also

of the nonconsensual nature and highly asymmetrical distributional effects
of such risk. 23 To gain legitimacy, regulatory choices must reflect public
perceptions of how strictly a particular risky activity should be
regulated.124 In the wake of the latest crisis, the general public is weary
and disappointed in the integrity of financial markets and regulation. There
is a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with a system that allows Wall
Street insiders to reap exorbitant private profits from risky speculative
activities, while the equally exorbitant costs of their failure are borne by
unsuspecting taxpayers. This public perception is an important factor that
supports putting risky financial instruments in the same category of strictly
regulated products as medical drugs and hazardous chemicals.

120. Id. at 36-37.
121. Id. at 37-38.
122. Id. at 38.
123. Scholars of regulation have observed that people evaluate the gravity of specific risks-and
the need to regulate such risks-not merely on the basis of purely statistical or other scientific
evidence but in the broader qualitative and relational context. As Cass Sunstein argues, citizens'
judgments about risk depend on many factors, including:
(1) the catastrophic nature of the risk; (2) whether the risk is uncontrollable; (3) whether the

risk involves irretrievable or permanent losses; (4) the social conditions under which a
particular risk is generated and managed, a point that connects to issues of consent,
voluntariness, and democratic control; (5) how equitably distributed the danger is or how
concentrated on identifiable, innocent, or traditionally disadvantaged victims, which ties to
both notions of community and moral ideals; [and] (6) how well understood the risk process
in question is ....
SUNSTEIN, supra note 70, at 133.

124. This fundamental concern with democratic legitimacy must be carefully balanced against the
potential danger of "elevat[ing] mass prejudice to public policy." Wiener, supra note 93, at 1512. In
the wake of the recent financial crisis, however, the lack of popular support for the regulatory status
quo and general dissatisfaction with the pace and direction of the current reform seem to present a far
more serious problem than any realistic possibility of ultra-populist prejudice-based over-regulation of
the financial services industry.
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II. PRODUCT APPROVAL REGULATION IN PRACTICE: PHARMACEUTICAL
DRUGS, CHEMICALS, AND COMMODITY FUTURES

The best-known model of product approval regulation in the United
States is the mandatory licensing of pharmaceutical drugs, biologics, and
medical devices by the FDA. In many respects, it is a quintessential form
of public safety regulation, an example of the precautionary approach in
practice.12 Although the FDA's administration of the drug approval
scheme is a target of continuing criticisms, it provides a valuable basis for
thinking about potential transferability of its key features into financial
services regulation.
Another potentially relevant example is the European Union's
Regulation on Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of
Chemicals ("REACH").126 This regulation was adopted in 2006 in order to
bring all existing chemical substances under a comprehensive regulatory
regime that includes, among other things, pre-approval requirements for
certain hazardous chemicals. The implementation of this ambitious E.U.wide program exemplifies the challenges of extending a comprehensive
regulatory scheme to a large number of previously unregulated products.
Both the FDA and the REACH program operate in areas that are
substantively different from financial services regulation. It is not widely
known that, until relatively recently, a similar system of market-entry
control also existed in the U.S. financial sector. Thus, from 1974 to 2000,
all exchange-traded commodity futures were subject to mandatory pre127
approval by the CFTC. Although that system was abandoned after the
adoption of the Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (the
"CFMA"),12 it is an important source of substantive and normative
principles that can potentially guide a search for an effective system of
licensing a broader range of complex financial products. 29

125. See, e.g, Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose PrecautionAfter All? A Comment on Comparisonand
Evolution ofRiskRegulatory Systems, 13 DuKE J. COMP. & INTL L. 207 (2003) (arguing that the FDA
regulatory regime is one of the examples of the United States implementing precautionary principle).
126. For general information on REACH Regulation, see Regulations, ECHA, http://echa.europa
.eu/web/guest/regulations (last visited May 11, 2012).
127. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(a)(12) (1999) (repealed 2000).
128. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 11, 12, & 15 U.S.C.).
129. This Article does not discuss the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act on the commodity futures
regulation, because the mandatory product approval regime was abolished in 2000, well before its
enactment. See id.
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This Part examines these three models of product approval regulation
and attempts to draw potential lessons for evaluating the idea of approval
regulation with respect to complex financial products. The purpose of this
discussion is not to provide a full appraisal of each regime's operation. Far
more modestly, the goal is to identify some of the key features of these
regulatory schemes in order to frame our inquiry into whether, and how, a
similar scheme can operate in the financial services sector.
A. The FDA Model: Focus on Public Safety
The FDA, an agency within the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, is responsible for protecting and promoting public health and
assuring the safety of foods, dietary supplements, pharmaceutical drugs,
medical devices, cosmetics, and many other products.130 The FDA is a
complex organization comprising several specialized centers, offices, and
laboratories, and its regulations affect a significant number of economic
activities.13 1 The agency implements several federal statutes, including the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 ("FDCA").m3 The scope and
intensity of the FDA's safety regulation differs depending on the risks and
other peculiar characteristics of different categories of products.

130. For general information on the FDA's mission, organization, and operation, see What does
FDA do?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm
194877.htm (last visited May 11, 2012).
131. According to one commentator,
The F.D.A. regulates more than $1 trillion worth of consumer goods, which amounts to about
25 cents of every consumer dollar spent in this country. This includes $466 billion in food
sales, $275 billion in drugs, $60 billion in cosmetics and $18 billion in vitamin supplements.
The agency is responsible for monitoring a third of all imported goods, from eggplant to
eyeliner, microwave ovens to monoclonal antibodies, slaughterhouses to cellphones.
Gardiner Harris, The Safety Gap, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2008, at B44.
132. 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (2006). Adopted in response to the deaths caused by the solventtainted antibiotic Elixir Sulfanilamide, the law initially operated more like a pre-market notification
scheme. A formal product approval regime for new drugs was established in 1962, in response to a
massive wave of severe birth defects associated with an anti-morning sickness drug, Thalidomide:
This event fueled public pressure for more stringent regulation of the rapidly growing
pharmaceutical industry. The 1962 Drug Amendments to the FDCA established a rigorous
pre-market approval process that placed the burden of proof on drug manufacturers to
demonstrate, under a substantial evidence standard, the safety and efficacy of their drug
products. Equally remarkable, these sweeping reforms were passed unanimously by the
House and Senate, despite substantial political opposition prior to the shock of the
thalidomide debacle.
David E. Adelman, New Directions in Environmental Law: A Cautiously Pessimistic Appraisal of
Trends in Toxics Regulation, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 377, 403 (2010).
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Pharmaceutical drugs are subject to the most intense regulatory
oversight, including the mandatory pre-market licensing of new drugs.
The main purpose of the FDA's new drug approval process is to prevent
potentially unsafe drugs from entering the market. In that sense, the FDA
serves as a true gatekeeper agency guarding the entrance to the market
and, in effect, controlling its composition. This regulatory scheme reflects
an important normative principle that places individual humans' health
and safety above the economic interests of private market participants.
In administering its drug approval program, the FDA makes decisions
that have significant medical and economic consequences. The FDA has a

corps of in-house scientists conducting independent research necessary to
support the agency decisions. Pharmaceutical companies present their own
research and test data, which is often voluminous and complex. In addition
to the strain on the agency's resources, the FDA's in-house review of this
scientific evidence often faces a further challenge of coping with
significant uncertainty. Thus, some have argued that the FDA's in-house
research tends to be excessively conservative and prevents potentially
valuable drugs from reaching the market. 134 At the same time, given the
irreversibility and potentially catastrophic nature of harm that an unsafe
drug can cause, such conservatism may not be unwarranted.13 1
From an institutional perspective, the FDA drug approval process
involves a fundamental trade-off.136 On the one hand, the FDA faces a
strong incentive to maintain its reputation as a safety regulator, which
necessitates caution in accepting the industry's data and a more thorough
probing of the scientific evidence.137 These reputational concerns at least
partially explain why the FDA sets higher substantive standards for
approving new drugs.138 The approval of an "unsafe" drug typically has

133. Virtually every aspect of drug production and distribution, including research, testing,
advertising, prescription, and safety, is subject to the FDA regulation. By contrast, foods and cosmetics
are generally regulated only for labeling and safety. Medical devices and biological therapeutic agents,
such as vaccines and blood or tissue products, are also subject to pre-market approval by the FDA. The
discussion here focuses on new drug approval.
134. See Lars Noah, Scientific Republicanism": Expert Peer Review And the Quest for
RegulatoryDeliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1035-36 (2000).

135. This debate about the practical efficacy of the FDA's regulatory philosophy is tied to the
academic debate on the virtues and limits of the precautionary principle as a default policy choice
under conditions of uncertainty. See supra notes 92 96 and accompanying text.
136. Daniel P. Carpenter, The Political Economy of FDA Drug Review: Processing,Politics,And
Lessons For Policy, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 52, 53 (2004).

137. Id. Carpenter refers to this as "the learning incentive."
138. Carpenter argues that the FDA is strongly driven by concerns about maintaining its
reputation as an effective safety regulator. Id. at 54; See also DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND
POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATION AT FDA (2010).
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high visibility and may irreversibly damage the FDA's reputation. l39
On the other hand, however, the FDA operates under strong political
pressure, as pharmaceutical firms lobby for faster approval of their
products. The agency's decision to deny approval often has significant
economic consequences for the pharmaceutical firm:
The agency's drug review decisions are essentially final (contesting
them is extremely difficult and costly) and immensely consequential
(regulators in other nations frequently cue off of the FDA's
decisions). If the FDA so chooses, it can materially impede the flow
of new products to the pharmaceutical marketplace, or it can help
accelerate that flow.140
Pharmaceutical companies frequently criticize the FDA for being too
rigid, conservative, and slow in granting drug approvals. From the start,
the industry attacked the FDA drug approval regime as stifling innovation
and blocking patient access to new drugs.141 Since the 1980s,
pharmaceutical firms have also successfully mobilized, and often
cultivated, patient-advocacy groups that had greater legitimacy as a public
critic of the FDA's supposed failures to approve potentially beneficial
drugs.142 This trend exacerbated the FDA's political dilemma and further
complicated its decision-making process.
One of the mechanisms the FDA employs to address the problem of
scientific uncertainty and potential policy bias is the use of outside
scientific peer-review of drug approval applications.14 3 Most of the FDA's
advisory committees are established either by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services or by the FDA Commissioner. 144 The FDA typically
solicits public nominations and applications for its scientific advisory
committees. To be selected, the members must be technical experts in
various areas, including "clinical medicine, engineering, biological and

139. Carpenter, supra note 136, at 55.
140. Id. at 52-53.
141. See Adelman, supra note 132, at 404.
142. Carpenter, supra note 136, at 56.
143. The FDA currently uses fifty scientific expert committees and panels that provide
independent expertise and advise the FDA on scientific issues of regulatory importance. See Advisory
Committees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm (last
visited May 11, 2012).
144.

PETER BARTON HUTT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW 1576 (2007). Some of the FDA's

scientific expert councils are statutorily established. These include the color additive advisory
committees, 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(C)(D) (2006), and the advisory review panels for medical devices,
21 U.S.C. § 360c(b) (2006).
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physical sciences, biostatistics, and food sciences." 45 In addition to
proven substantive expertise, the members of the FDA's technical
advisory committees must not have financial conflicts of interest. 146
The FDA's use of independent expert committees is typically justified
as an important method of improving the quality of administrative
decision-making under the condition of scientific uncertainty.147 Scientific
advisory committees play the key role in the FDA's drug approval
process. The FDA uses these institutions "to legitimate the soundness of
its analysis of a given product, as a public forum for discussion of
controversial issues, and, on occasion, as an 'appeals court' for disputed
agency decisions." 48 Thus, these committees serve not only a substantive,
but also an important political function. The FDA's practice of using
outside scientific committees for drug approval has also been
controversial. The FDA's expert advisory committees have been criticized
for not being truly independent from the FDA and for merely serving as a
legitimizing device for the agency's decisions. 149 There are also persistent
suspicions that the FDA experts tend to favor the industry because of
various hidden or indirect financial conflicts of interest.150
Another important feature of the FDA drug approval process is postapproval review, whereby the regulator allows a limited roll-out of the
drug and requires the firm to collect and produce data on its safety and
performance. This conditional approval process helps to generate valuable
information on which to base the final decision about the potential benefits
versus potential harms of a particular product. This information-generating
potential of the FDA-type approval regulation strengthens markets by
making them more predictable and safer for consumers.' 5 ' Some
commentators, however, criticize the FDA's post-approval monitoring
152
practices as insufficiently rigorous.

145. Membership Types, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/
AboutAdvisoryCommittees/CommitteeMembership/MembershipTypes/default.htm (last visited May
11,2012).
146. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 144, at 1588.
147. See Noah, supra note 134, at 1034.
148. See HUTT ET AL., supra note 146, at 1573.
149. See id. at 1060.
150. See, e.g., HUTT ET AL., supra note 146, at 1588.
151. See Carpenter et al., supra note 107, at 36.
152. See, e.g., Frances H. Miller, Medical Errors,New, Drug Approval, andPatient Safety, in THE
REALITY OF PRECAUTION 265, supra note 96 ("The efficacy of post-market surveillance leaves much

to be desired in both the United States and the EU.").
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B. Chemicals Regulation in the European Union: REACH
Regulation of chemical substances aims at protecting human health and
the environment from potentially catastrophic risks. The principle of
exercising precaution, therefore, is of particular salience in this regulatory
area. 153
In the U.S., the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") regulates
chemicals under the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 ("TSCA").154
The TSCA established a system of pre-manufacturing notification and
review by the EPA for all "new" chemicals introduced into the market
after the law was passed. Chemicals already in commerce as of that date
were labeled "existing" substances and were not subject to EPA review. 5 5
For "new" chemical products, the TSCA does not require companies to
submit hazard data to the EPA unless the EPA requests such data in the
course of its 90-day pre-manufacturing review.156 Under the TSCA, the
EPA must demonstrate that the chemical is dangerous enough to warrant
testing and hazard data submission, which inhibits the agency's ability to
demand pre-market risk assessments and forces it to rely on the voluntary
submission of test data.157 As a result, the EPA lacks adequate scientific
information on the toxicity of most chemicals.1' This allocation of the
burden of proof under the TSCA creates incentives for chemical
companies to maintain "strategic ignorance" and avoid developing toxicity
data on their products.15 9

153. See Ortwin Renn & E. Donald Elliott, Chemicals, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION, supra
note 96, at 223, 224.
154. 15 U.S.C. §2601 etseq. (2006).
155. See Felice Cooper & Rebecca Lawson, Environmental Liability: Chemicals Reform in the
United States (17 May, 2010), available at http://www.allenovery.com/AOWEB/Knowledge/Editorial
.aspx?contentTypelD=1&contentSubTypelD=7944&it.
156. Id.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 2603 (2006); See also Sachs, supra note 92; John S. Applegate, Synthesizing
TSCA and REACH: Practical Principlesfor Chemical Regulation Reform, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 721
(2008).
158.

See U.S.

Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE,

GAO-09-428T,

CHEMICAL REGULATION:

OPTIONS FOR ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (2009),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123792.pdf. As the report noted,
As a result, EPA does not routinely assess the risks of the over 83,000 chemicals already in
use. Moreover, TSCA does not require chemical companies to test the approximately 700
new chemicals introduced into commerce each year for toxicity, and companies generally do
not voluntarily perform such testing.
Id. at 1.
159. See Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of EnvironmentalLaw to Produce
Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DuKE L.J. 1619, 1685 (2004); Sachs, supra
note 92, at 1301.
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Prior to 2006, the European Union had a similar system of chemicals
regulation, which required pre-market notification and testing only for
"new" chemicals introduced after 1981 but not for "existing" chemicals as
of that cut-off date. A total of 100,106 chemicals that were on the market
as of 1981 were exempt from the regulatory requirements.160 Under that
regime, companies had to test and notify the regulators of any "new"
chemicals in production volumes as low as ten kilograms per year, while
they could manufacture and import any "existing" chemicals without
going through this expensive procedure.161 That policy created perverse
incentives to continue using the untested "existing" chemicals, and

inhibited research and innovation. 16 2
In 1999, the European Commission ("EC") began working on a new
regulatory framework, REACH, which, after years of negotiations, was
formally adopted in December 2006.163 A new European Chemicals
Agency ("ECHA") was formed to administer the new EU-wide regulatory
regime.164 In contrast to the prior regulatory scheme, REACH brings all
existing and new chemicals under a comprehensive system of registration,
pre-market risk assessment, and mandatory pre-approval for certain
dangerous substances.165 The new scheme is designed to produce an
extensive body of data on all chemicals in the EU market.166
REACH explicitly shifts the burden of testing chemicals for toxicity
and ensuring their safety from the regulatory authorities to private industry
actors. 16 REACH "is based on the principle that it is for manufacturers,
importers and downstream users to ensure that they manufacture, place on
the market or use such substances that do not adversely affect human
health or the environment." 68 Instead of mandating regulatory preapproval for all chemical substances, however, the program adopts a tiered

160. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 236. Between 1981 and 2006, only about 3,000 "new"
chemicals were put on the EU market. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See Commission Regulation 1907/2006, 2006 OJ. (L 396) 1 (EC) [hereinafter REACH],
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri-OJ:L:2006:396:0001:0849:EN:PDF.
164. For more information about the ECHA, see About Us, ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/
web/guest/about-usjsessionid=E54AD754F846A0DI507849D89B41DD09.live2 (last visited May 11,
2012).
165. See REACH, EUROPEAN COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/chemicals/reach/
index en.htm (last visited May 11, 2012).
166. See Sachs, supra note 92, at 1302 ("By rewarding knowledge and making chemical
manufacturers responsible for data production, REACH is helping to end the data drought that has
plagued European chemical regulation since the early 1980s.").
167. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 237.
168. REACH, supra note 163, at 47.
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approach that differentiates among categories of chemicals, depending on
their quantity in commerce and toxic characteristics. 169
The quantity of a substance manufactured or used in the EU is the key
factor in determining applicable testing requirements. Under REACH,
only companies that produce or import more than one ton of any chemical
substance per year must register that substance in a central database and
submit to the ECHA extensive testing and risk data. 170 Once the REACH
registration requirement is triggered, the level of testing required varies,
depending on whether a particular chemical is sold or produced in
quantities above ten, one hundred, and one thousand metric tons
annually.17 1
In their submissions to the ECHA, manufacturers, importers or their
customers must also identify the uses of each substance and, for chemicals
produced or imported in volumes over ten tons per year, provide chemical
safety reports.17 2 These reports pertain specifically to the identified uses of
the chemical: they must contain an assessment of risks such uses pose to
human health and the environment, and define the conditions of use under
which those risks can be adequately controlled.
REACH further differentiates among categories of chemicals
depending on their toxic characteristics, so that the most hazardous
substances require the most extensive and rigorous testing and are subject
to additional regulatory controls. Certain highly dangerous chemicals,
which the ECHA designates as Substances of Very High Concern
("SVHC"),174 are placed on the official Authorization List and cannot be
169. See Adelman, supra note 132, at 393 ("Classification based on quantities in commerce and
chemical characteristics are defining features of REACH.").
170. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 236. Registration dossiers include the data on the intrinsic
properties and hazards of each substance, which may be established through testing, computer

modeling, or epidemiologic studies. Id. at 238. The ECHA manages the central database containing
collected data.
171. Adelman, supra note 132, at 393 ("For chemicals sold or manufactured in quantities of one to
ten metric tons annually, testing should be limited to in vitro testing of acute hazards. The testing
requirements are elevated to a standard base set of toxicology testing for chemicals sold or
manufactured in quantities of ten to one hundred metric tons annually. Rigorous 'substance-tailored
testing for long-term effects' is required for quantities that exceed one thousand metric tons
annually.")

172. See Information Requirements, ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/regulations/reach/
substance-registration/information-requirements (last visited May 11, 2012).
173. Id.
174. The SVHC group includes, for example, substances that are carcinogenic, mutagenic, and
toxic to reproduction ("CMR") and other substances identified on a case-by-case basis, for which there
is scientific evidence of probable serious effects that present similar concerns. See Authorisation,
ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/regulations/reach/authorisation (last visited May 11, 2012).
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used or put on the market unless granted exemptions for specific uses. 1
Both the SVHC designation and the subsequent authorization process
involve public consultations and detailed review of scientific data and
opinions.176
The purpose of this pre-market approval scheme is to control the use of
hazardous chemicals and to encourage the industry to substitute such
chemicals with less dangerous substances. Requests for authorization of
specific SVHCs must be accompanied by a substitution plan and evidence
that either the particular SVHC can be used safely or that the
socioeconomic benefits of its use outweigh its risks.17 Public
consultations are an important part of the process, which allows the
industry and the broader public to submit comments and provide
information on potential substitutes and alternative technologies.17 8 In
addition, the ECHA has the authority to propose bans or restrictions on the
manufacture, marketing or use of chemicals posing unacceptable risks to
human health or the environment. 179
The program's official goal is to "ensure a high level of protection of
human health and the environment," while also "enhancing
competitiveness and innovation."'
Implementation of this program,
however, presents daunting challenges. Eliminating the distinction
between "new" and "existing" chemicals under REACH means that the
industry could potentially be required to test and register over 100,000
previously untested chemical substances, all within a relatively short
period of three to five years.18 1 The tiered regulatory approach helps to

175. Id.
176. For example, in early 2011, after more than two years of public consultations and studies, the
ECHA put six chemicals on the Authorization List. See Authorisation List, ECHA, http:/echa
.europa.eu/web/guest/addressing-chemicals-of-concern/authorisation/recommendation-for-inclusion-in

-the-authorisation-list/authorisation-list (last visited May 11, 2012).
177. REACH creates some flexibility by introducing two groups of CMRs for purposes of
authorization: those with a "safe threshold" of toxicity and those for which no threshold of "safe use"
can be established. For the first group, an authorization will be granted if the producer can show that
the risks associated with the proposed use of such substances can be controlled effectively. For all
other hazardous substances, an authorization will be granted only if there is no safer alternative and the
socioeconomic benefits of their use significantly outweigh the risks. See Renn & Elliott, supra note
153, at 240.
178. See Applications for Authorisation, ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/addressingchemicals-of-concern/authorisation/applications-for-authorisation (last visited May 11, 2012).
179. See Restriction, ECHA, http://echa.europa.eu/web/guest/addressing-chemicals-of-concern/
restriction (last visited May 11, 2012).
180. REACH, supra note 163, at 2.
181. The EC mandated that the process of testing, assessing, and registering all chemicals had to
be completed by 2012, while the registration of very high-volume (above one thousand tons per year)
and highly toxic or hazardous chemicals (such as CMR in volumes above one ton per year) had to be

98

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:63

limit the scope of this undertaking by targeting only those chemicals that,
based on their volume and toxicity, create the highest potential human and
environmental exposure to risk. In 2003, it was estimated that only about
30,000 chemicals were produced or imported in quantities exceeding the
new threshold for registration, although some of the later studies raised
that estimate to about 68,000 chemicals. 182 Only a small percentage of
these substances are likely to be classified as SVHCs and require
mandatory authorization. 183
Chemical companies objected to the adoption of REACH as imposing
exorbitant costs on the industry, potentially stifling research and
innovation, and creating a competitive disadvantage for the EU.' 84 The
industry also argued that REACH would render manufacturing of certain
lower-volume chemicals less profitable, which would limit market supply
and may cause withdrawal of substances from the market, and have a
disproportionally negative effect on economic viability of small and
medium-sized chemical companies.185 The program's proponents,
however, argued that its implementation costs were not excessively high in
comparison to the industry's total revenues, and should be viewed as
socially desirable internalization of externalities.18 6
Still, the overall cost and administrative complexity of transitioning
from the pre-2006 system to the REACH regime present a significant
problem. In addition to monetary costs, the ECHA has to balance
companies' concerns regarding disclosure of proprietary data against the
need to ensure transparency and public access to information on hazardous
substances. Another controversial issue relates to the increase in animal
testing in order to produce the mandatory risk assessment data.' Animal
rights activists have been extremely critical of this controversial aspect of

completed by 2010. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 236.
182. See Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 239. In over thirty years before the enactment of
REACH, government regulators required only seventy chemical risk assessments, which pales in
comparison even to the lower estimate of 30,000 high-volume substances on the market. See Noah M.
Sachs, Jumping the Pond: TransnationalLaw, and the Future of Chemical Regulation, 62 VAND. L.
REV. 1817, 1833 34 (2009).

183. See Adelman, supra note 132, at 394 (estimating that a total of about 1400 chemicals are
likely to require authorization as SVHCs).
184. Calculating potential direct costs of REACH to the chemical industry has been a hotly
debated issue, with estimates ranging from C2.3 billion to E5.2 billion. These estimates, however, may
be too optimistic. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 239.
185. Id. at 240.
186. Sachs, supra note 92, at 1333.
187. Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 239. According to some estimates, the mandatory testing
of the existing chemicals may require fifty-four million research animals. Id
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REACH and lobbied to reduce the impact of tests on animals.' 8 8
Introducing new testing technologies and more efficient methods of
sharing existing experimental data, advocated by animal-rights groups,
potentially reduces the rise in the number of research animals killed in the
189
process.
As some scholars have observed, REACH is predominantly a data and
information collection regime, which shifts the cost of producing such
information to the private sector and empowers regulators to assess the
tolerability of risk. 190 It remains to be seen how effective REACH will be
in achieving its proclaimed goals in practice.191 Nevertheless, the sheer
magnitude of this E.U.-wide undertaking to build a regime for registering,
tracing, and controlling the use of chemical substances demonstrates the
feasibility of ambitious reforms that reflect an explicit political
commitment to protect human health and environment.
Similar to the FDA drug licensing scheme, REACH is based on the
requirement for pre-market testing of regulated products. Conditioning
market access on the pre-market experimental assessment of systemic risk
posed by financial contracts, however, may not be feasible. It is difficult,
if not impossible, to create a self-contained test market for a new financial
instrument and to ensure that no risk will spill over into the broader
financial system and cause irreversible damage to systemic stability. The
centrality of experimental testing and pre-market empirical data collection
to the product approval regulation of pharmaceutical drugs and chemicals
potentially limits our ability to draw meaningful substantive lessons
directly applicable to financial services regulation.
At the same time, however, the requirement of empirical testing of
individual products' safety may not be the only way to ensure a workable
product licensing regime. A system of product pre-approval, which existed
in the U.S. commodity futures sector before 2000, provides an example of
a regime that was not based on mandatory pre-market testing of financial
contracts.

188. See The Truth About REACH Animal Testing, EUROPEAN COALITION TO END ANIMAL
EXPERIMENTS, http://www.eceae.org/de/what-we-do/campaigns/reach/the-truth-about-reach-animal-

testing (last visited May 11, 2012).
189. See id.
190. See Renn & Elliott, supra note 153, at 242.
191. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 132, at 379-80 (arguing that agency discretion in
implementing the regulation may mute the intended effects of procedural burden-shifting and that
REACH "opens the door to evasion through its tiered chemical classification scheme and the
flexibility it affords manufacturers to use alternative testing methods."); Applegate, supra note 157, at
724 (arguing that REACH was conceived as a Hegelian "antithesis" to the TSCA and that the truly
precautionary chemicals regulation has to offer a greater "synthesis" of these two schemes).
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C. ProductApproval in Commodity Futures Regulation: Focus on Market
Manipulationand Speculation
1. Commodity Futures Regulation-Overview
A futures contract is a form of derivative instrument.192 Commodity
futures are standardized bilateral contracts that obligate one party (the
buyer, or "long") to purchase, and the other party (the seller, or "short") to
deliver a specified quantity of a specified asset, or underlying commodity,
at a specified future date and at a specified price. 193 In the United States,
the Chicago Board of Trade ("CBOT") began listing grain futures in the
mid-1860s.' 94 In the early twentieth century, rampant speculation in
commodities and commodity futures, and the spread of "bucket shops," 195
led the farming community to lobby for federal regulation of futures
trading.196 In 1921, Congress enacted the Future Trading Act, which
sought to outlaw bucket shops. 197 After the statute was declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,198 Congress enacted the Grain
Futures Act of 1922.199 The statutory scheme for regulation of futures was
revised several times after 1922. 200 In 1974, Congress enacted the
Commodity Exchange Act (the "CEA"),201 and created the CFTC as an
independent federal agency overseeing the markets for commodity futures
and options. 202

192. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
193. Futures are functionally similar to forward contracts. Unlike forwards, however, futures are
standardized, traded on organized exchanges, and typically settled in cash. See Krawiec, supra note 16,
at 10.
194. From Water Street to the World, CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH. GRP., http://www.cmegroup.com/
company/history/magazine/Summer2007/FromWaterStreetToTheWorld.html
(last visited May 11,
2012).
195. A "bucket shop" was a gambling operation whereby the shop operator took customers' bets
on price movement of various commodities but did not place orders on an exchange. See, e.g., Thomas
Lee Hazen, Public Policy: Rational Investments, Speculation, or Gambling? Derivatives Securities
and FinancialFutures and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 987,
1014-17 (1992).
196. For an analysis of the political origins of federal futures regulation, see Roberta Romano, The
PoliticalDynamics ofDerivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997).
197. 42 Stat. 187 (Aug. 24, 1921).
198. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922).
199. 42 Stat. 998 (Sept. 21, 1922), 7 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1922).
200. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices-The Unprosecutable
Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281 (1991) (detailing the history of the commodity futures regulation).
201. 7 U.S.C. § I et. seq (2006).
202. The CFTC consists of five Commissioners appointed by the President, with advice and
consent of the Senate, for five-year terms. The President designates one of the Commissioners as the
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The CEA, administered by the CFTC, regulates the offer and sale of
futures contracts and commodity options, the operation of futures
exchanges, and the activities of various futures market participants. Under
the broad statutory definition of "commodity," almost all futures contracts
are subject to the CEA.203 In contrast to disclosure-based securities
regulation, the CEA establishes broad categories of permissible and
impermissible transactions. Unless specifically exempted, commodity
futures and options must be offered and sold on futures exchanges or other
204
Contracts entered into in contravention of
organized contract markets.
the statutory requirements are illegal and unenforceable, and participants

in such illegal transactions are subject to a wide array of civil and criminal
1- 205
penalties.
The CEA's key policy objectives are:
To deter and prevent price manipulation or any other disruptions to
market integrity; to ensure the financial integrity of all transactions
subject to this chapter and the avoidance of systemic risk; to protect
all market participants from fraudulent or other abusive sales
practices and misuses of customer assets; and to promote
responsible innovation and fair competition among boards of trade,
other markets and market participants. 206
Preventing fraud and price manipulation in the U.S. futures and related
cash commodity markets has always been the central driving force behind
the federal regulatory scheme.20' The CEA emphasizes that futures serve
"a national public interest by providing a means of managing and
assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing
information." 208 As a result of this special "utility" function, "futures
trading occupies a somewhat unique economic position in the eyes of the

law." 209
Chairperson. For more information on the CFTC, see U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N,

http://www.cftc.gov/index.htm (last viewed May 11, 2012).
203. See 7 U.S.C. § la(4) (defining the term "commodity").
204. 7 U.S.C. §6.
205. 7 U.S.C. § 13.

206. 7 U.S.C. §5(b).
207. The federal regulatory regime for futures markets was initially created in response to
producers' complaints about the economically-harmful effects of widespread commodity and futures
market manipulation through "comers", "squeezes", and "bucket shop" speculation. See Romano,
supra note 196.
208. 7 U.S.C. §5(a).
209.

1989).

PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COMMODITIES REGULATION 261 (2d ed.
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2. Pre-CFM4Regulatory Regime: ContractDesignationand the
Concept ofEconomic Purpose
Before the enactment of the CFMA in 2000, one of the most significant
provisions of the CEA was section 5a(a)(12) that required the terms and
conditions of all futures contracts to be pre-approved for trading by the
CFTC.2 10 This requirement reflected the statute's original concern with
excessive speculation that negatively affected the underlying commodity
markets. As the leading treatise explained:
At nearly every turn, the Act reiterates the utility of futures trading
for (1) hedging against price risks, (2) the discovery of prices
through vigorous competition, and (3) the actual pricing of
commercial commodity transactions. While futures contracts offer,
certainly, an investment opportunity as well, that feature seems in
the Act to be subordinate or secondary in importance to the
commercial uses that those markets offer.

. . .

[I]t does not appear

that a futures contract with a pure investment purpose must
necessarily be foreclosed, but the history of administration of the
Act leaves little doubt that a futures contract without a commercial
purpose faces long odds of ever being approved by the
Commission. 211
This dichotomy between commercial and "purely investment" purposes
of futures contracts reflects a fundamental tension in the CEA regime. The
CEA has never contained an explicit requirement of commercial utility as
a condition of contract designation. Prior to 1974, the statute did not
specify whether or not futures contracts with purely investment (as
opposed to bona fide commercial hedging or price discovery) purposes
should be approved for trading. 1 2 In 1974, the House of Representatives
passed a bill, H.R. 13113, which sought to prohibit authorization of any
contract unless that contract served a bona fide economic function, either
as a price discovery mechanism or as a device for those in the related cash

210. 7 U.S.C.

§ 7a(a)(12)

(1999). Before the CFMA, this subsection was "one of the most

important in both legal and practical effect." PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
DERIVATIVES REGULATION 180 (2004) [hereinafter DERIVATIVES REGULATION].
211. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 261 (footnote omitted).

212. Before 1974, the statute did not explicitly require an affirmative regulatory pre-approval of
the terms of futures contracts. Since 1968, the Secretary of Agriculture had only the power to
disapprove any trading rule of a contract market, which violated the statute. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (pre1974).
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commodity markets to hedge their commercial, as opposed to investment,
risks.2 13 The industry objected to this prospective economic purpose test,
arguing that it was difficult to predict the ultimate uses of a new
product. 2 14 In response to industry pressure, the Senate rejected an explicit
"economic purpose" test for approval of futures contracts and substituted
it with a more vaguely stated "public interest" test. 215 As adopted, the CEA
contained the Senate's provision that conditioned approval of futures
contracts on the affirmative demonstration by the board of trade that
"transactions for future delivery in the commodity for which designation
as a contract market is sought will not be contrary to the public
interest." 216
At the same time, however, the Conference Committee report that
accompanied the original enactment of this provision in 1974 noted that
the "broader language of the Senate provision would include the concept
of the 'economic purpose' test provided in the House bill subject to the
final test of the 'public interest."' 217 The newly established CFTC
interpreted this language as requiring that every futures contract had to
meet both the broad "public interest" and the more specific "economic
purpose" tests
The key requirements for contract designation were set forth in sections
5 and 5a of the CEA. 219 In essence, the statute required the exchange
applying for designation to make an affirmative showing that the contract
provided for delivery of the underlying commodity at a location where
there was a sufficiently active and liquid cash market and where the

213. Specifically, H.R. 13113 stipulated that the contract should not be approved unless
[T]he board of trade demonstrates that the prices involved in transactions for future delivery
in the commodity for which designation as a contract market is sought are, or reasonably can
be expected to be, generally quoted and disseminated as a basis for determining prices to
producers, merchants, or consumers of such commodity or the products or byproducts thereof
or that such transactions are, or reasonably can be expected to be utilized by producers,
merchants or consumers engaged in handling such commodity or the products or byproducts
thereof in interstate commerce as a means of hedging themselves against possible loss
through fluctuations in price.
JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 262 (quoting REPORT ON H.R. 13113 OF THE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, H.R. REP. No. 93-975, at 103 (2d Sess. 1974)).

214. Id. at 263 n.3.
215.

Id. at 263 (citing REPORT ON H.R. 13113 OF THE SENATE AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY

COMMITTEE, S. REP. No. 93-113 1, at 72 (2d Sess. 1974)).
216. 7 U.S.C. §7(7) (1999) (repealed 2000).
217. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 263 (citing REPORT ON H.R. 13113 OF THE
COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE, H.R. REP. No. 93-1383, at 14 (2d Sess. 1974)).

218. Id. at 264.
219. 7 U.S.C. §§7, 7a (1999).
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exchange had official inspection facilities.2 20 This provision aimed to
ensure the existence, at a point of delivery, of a liquid cash market in
which the "shorts" could buy the necessary quantities of the underlying
commodity for delivery and the "longs" could resell the commodity after
taking delivery.22' Clearly, this language contemplated an actual delivery
of the underlying commodity, thus tying the futures instrument to a
commercial activity: trade in the underlying commodity.
The new contracts also had to pass the statutory "public interest"
test.222 Despite the open-ended nature of this standard, the CFTC's view
was that, as a practical matter, only futures contracts that had commercial
utility and had potential to facilitate bona fide commercial hedging or
price discovery in the underlying commodity markets could also pass the
"public interest" test of Section 5(g). As a practical matter, it was assumed
that futures contracts that had no economic purpose other than financial
investment were not viable in the long run, as trading in such futures
223
would be especially vulnerable to speculative ups and downs2.
Thus,
futures exchanges were expected to design and list for trading contracts
that had "a solid base of commercial hedging or pricing participation."224
In addition to the substantive review of the terms of the proposed
contracts, the CFTC had to scrutinize the exchanges' internal policies,
procedures, and practices to ascertain their ability to monitor trading in the
proposed futures contract. If the CFTC was not satisfied with an
exchange's ability to ensure market integrity and limit the potential for
market manipulation and other trading abuses, it could deny
225
designation. Thus, the statute linked the viability and functional utility
of a futures contract to the exchanges' self-regulatory capacity.
As part of the contract designation process, the CFTC had statutory
authority to mandate changes in the specific terms of the proposed futures
contracts if such changes would "tend to prevent or diminish price
manipulation, market congestion, or the abnormal movement of such

220. 7 U.S.C. § 7(1) (1999) (repealed 2000). The statute required that the commodity was
deliverable "at a terminal market where [it] is sold in sufficient volumes and under such conditions as
fairly to reflect the general value of the commodity and the differences in value between the various
grades of such commodity." Id.
221. JoHNsoN & HAZEN, supranote 209, at 267.
222. 7 U.S.C. §7(7) (1999) (repealed 2000).
223. JoHNsoN & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 270 ("While, ... the threshold public interest
standard for designation of new futures contracts may not embrace, necessarily, the specific economic
purpose test that the Congress considered in 1974, it seems clear that a proposed futures contract that
is not sound as an economic matter will rarely if ever serve either public or private interests.").
224. Id. at 264.
225. 7 U.S.C. §7(4) (1999) (repealed 2000).
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,,226

commodity in interstate commerce". The exercise of power, however,
was subject to strict procedural constraints, which showed Congressional
reluctance to allow the regulator to substitute its judgment for that of an
exchange. 2 2 7 Even though the CFTC did not use this power often, it
functioned as a credible threat prompting exchanges to be responsive to
the regulator's comments. 228
The statute imposed other procedural requirements on the CFTC,
including various timeframes for approval decisions22 9 and requirements to
23
consult with other federal regulatory agencies.230
In addition, the CFTC
had to publish in the Federal Register notice of proposed exchange rules
and amendments that were of "major economic significance" and afford
all interested persons an opportunity to submit comments on the
proposals. 23 1 Applications for contract designation were typically viewed
as having such significance.
To assist exchanges in preparing applications for product approval, the
CFTC adopted Guideline No. 1, which detailed the information to be
232
submitted to the agency.22
Reflecting the CFTC's original position that
the statutory public interest standard encompassed an economic purpose
test, the Guideline required that an exchange make an affirmative showing
that the proposed new contract was "reasonably expected to serve, on
more than occasional basis," as a price discovery or hedging tool for
commercial users of the underlying commodity. 233 The Guideline required
the applicants to describe and justify specific economic terms of the

226. 7 U.S.C. §7a(a)(10) (1999) (repealed 2000).
227. Id. Before directing the change in contract terms, the CFTC had to provide the applying
exchange with an initial notice and an opportunity to correct the problem within seventy-five days. If
the CFTC was not satisfied, it had to give the exchange another notice and opportunity for a hearing
before exercising its power to change the terms of the contract. The exchange could file an exception
to the changes before the CFTC's order became effective. Id.
228. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 209, at 268-69 ("To date, the Commission has not formally
exercised its authority under section 5a(l0), but like the gunboat in the harbor, its existence has proven
effective in encouraging the markets to rethink certain of their contracts.").
229. Since 1983, the CFTC generally had up to one year to render a final decision on contract
designation. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(12)(A) (1999) (repealed 2000). In 1997, in response to the industry's
complaints about the competitive harm caused by the long product roll-out timetable, the CFTC
adopted a rule that allowed certain contracts to be approved on a "fast track." Such contracts were
deemed approved within ten days of application for designation, in the absence of an adverse action by
the CFTC. All the other new contracts were deemed approved within forty-five days, unless the CFTC
notified the exchange otherwise. 17 C.F.R. §5.1 (1999).
230. Thus, the CEA required the CFTC to provide the Treasury Department and the Federal
Reserve with at least forty-five days to comment on any proposed futures contract involving U.S.
Government obligations. 7 U.S.C. §4a(g)(2) (1999) (repealed 2000).
231. 7 U.S.C. §7a(a)(12)(A) (1999) (repealed 2000).
232. 17 C.F.R. §40, App. A (formerly 17 C.F.R. § 5, App. A).
233. Id., items (a)(4) (physically-settled contracts), (b)(4) (cash-settled contracts).
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contracts, such as delivery points, price differentials for different
commodity grades, and many others.234 In particular, the application had to
explain and justify any deviation of contract terms and conditions from
standard industry practices.
Thus, between 1974 and 2000, commodity futures were subject to the
statutory regime of mandatory product approval regulation. Under that
regime, futures exchanges had an affirmative obligation to demonstrate, to
the CFTC's satisfaction, that every contract they intended to list was
reasonably expected to facilitate efficient pricing and hedging against
commercial risks in the underlying commodity markets. Under the
CFTC's approach, only contracts that satisfied this economic purpose
requirement could also be expected to meet the statutory "public interest"
test for contract designation.
It is difficult to tell with certainty how rigorously the CFTC fulfilled its
product approval mandate in practice, particularly given the structure of
the industry dominated by a few powerful exchanges. The dynamics of the
CFTC's relationship with futures exchanges, which themselves act as
quasi-public authorities in their capacity as self-regulatory organizations,
are inherently more cooperative than adversarial2.236 In this context,
regulators may prefer using less formal methods of persuasion and
communication with the industry rather than public exercises of punitive
power.237 It also increases the likelihood of agency capture by the industry
interests.

234. Id., items (a)(3) (physically-settled contracts), (b)(3) (cash-settled contracts). These
justifications generally had to be based on appropriate economic data and not solely on expert opinion.
See JOHNSON & HAZEN, supranote 209, at 273.
235. 17 C.F.R. § 40, App. A, items (a)(3) (physically-settled contracts), (b)(3) (cash-settled
contracts).
236. This is widely understood as an important factor explaining the "cultural" differences
between the CFTC and the enforcement-oriented SEC. See Jerry W. Markham, Merging the SEC and
CFTC A Clash of Cultures, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 537, 591-92 (2009) (contrasting the "hands-off
regulatory attitude" of the CFTC staff with the "pro-regulatory stance" of the attorney-dominated
SEC).
237. Nevertheless, it is important not to overstate the effects of this "cozy" relationship between
the CFTC and the futures exchanges. One example of the CFTC's use of its statutory product approval
powers was the unusually intense controversy over the CBOT's corn and soybean futures contracts in
1996-98. In December 1996, the CFTC notified the CBOT that the delivery terms for its long-standing
corn and soybean futures were "no longer adequate to prevent price manipulation, market congestion,
or abnormal movement of the commodities in commerce," as required by the CEA. Deliveryfor CBT
Corn, Soybean Contracts No Longer Adequate, CFTC Tells Exchange, 29 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
21, 21 (Jan. 3, 1997). After the CBOT finally changed the outdated delivery terms, the CFTC approved
its application for contract market designation in corn and soybean futures on May 7, 1998. CFTC
Approves CBT Proposalsfor Corn and Soybean Futures Contracts, 30 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
(May 8, 1998).
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These important issues, however, are beyond the scope of the present
discussion, which focuses on the statutory design of the contract
designation regime as a model of financial product approval regulation.
The core purpose of the CEA contract designation scheme was to prevent
market manipulation, fraud, excessive speculation, and other abusive
trading practices that threatened the integrity and efficiency of the U.S.
commodities markets. One of the fundamental normative principles
underlying that regime was the belief that futures markets fulfilled an
important social function by supporting productive economic activity and,
therefore, had to be protected from being turned into a venue for pure
financial speculation.

3. The CFMA4 and the Demise of the Mandatory ProductApproval
Regime
Before the enactment of the CFMA, mandatory approval of contract
market rules was one of the CFTC's "most formidable powers and one of
the exchanges' most burdensome duties."239 It was also one of the key
factors that made the CEA "an important-if often overlookedantispeculation law."240 In the 1990s, futures exchanges and financial
institutions active in the growing OTC derivatives markets heavily lobbied
for deregulating commodity futures trading and eliminating the
requirement of prior contract approval.
The political pressure to liberalize the CEA regime reflected the
fundamental changes in the nature of the futures markets.241 When the
Future Trading Act was enacted, the majority of futures were tied to
agricultural commodities, and manipulative trading strategies in the
futures markets directly affected farmers and other commercial producers
and users of the physical commodities. With the advent of financial
futures-contracts with the underlying financial assets rather than physical
commodities-financial institutions and professional investors became the
dominant players in the futures markets.242 These financially sophisticated
investors did not see the need for the governmental "micromanagement"
of futures markets and pushed for liberalization of the existing rules. 243

238. See supra note 206-207 and accompanying text.
239. DERIVATIVES REGULATION, supra note 210, at 180.

240. Lynn A. Stout, Why The Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 705 (1999).
241. DERIVATIVES REGULATION, supranote 210, at 182.
242. Id.
243. Id
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As trading in financial futures came to dominate futures trading and
financial investors far outnumbered commercial users of futures, the entire
dynamics of the commodity futures markets changed fundamentally. The
futures market became intricately tied to the exploding OTC derivatives
markets, which had an advantage of being unregulated and offering
financial players far more flexibility and greater potential returns. 244 NonU.S. derivatives exchanges began entering the U.S. markets and offering a
wider range of financial products to U.S. investors.245 U.S. futures
exchanges forcefully argued that the CFTC approval process caused
significant delays in product listing and prevented them from competing
with foreign exchanges and the OTC derivatives markets.
In 1997, the CFTC responded by creating a "fast-track" contract
approval procedure for certain commodities, under which a contract was
deemed approved within ten days after submission unless the CFTC
notified the exchange otherwise.246 That did not satisfy the futures
industry, however. The new opportunity to liberalize the product approval
regime came after Brooksley Born, an outspoken advocate of stronger
derivatives regulation, resigned from her post as the Chair of the CFTC on
June 1, 1999. William Rainer, a private investment manager with reported
ties to President Clinton, was nominated as the new CFTC head on June
23, 1999, and quickly confirmed by the Senate. 247 On June 25, 1999, the
CBOT, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, and the New York Mercantile
Exchange petitioned the CFTC, among other things, to exempt U.S.
futures exchanges from the regulatory contract approval process. 248 On
November 17, 1999, responding to this petition, the CFTC adopted new
regulation that permitted futures exchanges to list new contracts for

244. See generally REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS,
OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT (Nov. 1999),

available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/documents/otcact.pdf (discussing the
growth of the OTC derivatives markets and its impact on the futures markets and regulation). The
growth of OTC derivatives in the 1980s-90s raised difficult legal and regulatory questions and created
a bitter jurisdictional and administrative turf war between the CFTC and the SEC. Id at 6-15. An
examination of this inter-agency struggle is beyond the scope of this Article.
245. In the late 1990s, the CFTC granted no-action relief to several foreign boards of trade,
including Germany's Eurex, France's ParisBourse, and England's LIFFE, allowing them to establish
electronic terminals in the U.S. without having to meet contract market designation requirements of
the CEA. See, e.g., Eurex, ParisBourseGain Access to Systems from Within US., 31 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 1095 (Aug. 13, 1999).
246. 17 C.F.R. § 5.1 (1999). See also supra note 229.
247. See William Rainer, MARKETS WIKI, http://www.marketswiki.com/mwiki/William J. Rainer
#cite note-5 (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
248. See 64 Fed. Reg. 46,356 (Aug. 25, 1999).
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trading pursuant to exchange certification, without prior Commission
approval. 249
In January 2000, the CFTC published a report entitled "A New
Regulatory Framework," which laid down a program of massive
liberalization of U.S. commodity futures regulation. 2 0 Among other
things, the report advocated a switch from the traditionally prescriptive
rules-based regulatory regime to a principles-based framework, which
would give far greater operational flexibility to futures exchanges. 25' As
part of that switch, the CFTC recommended eliminating the mandatory
contract designation process in favor of exchange certification of new
products' compliance with the CEA. 252
On December 15, 2000, Congress passed the CFMA, a comprehensive
piece of legislation that incorporated most of the CFTC's proposals and
radically liberalized the regulatory regime for futures and OTC
derivatives. 253 Among other things, the CFMA repealed section 5a(a)(12)
of the CEA and eliminated the requirement of prior approval by the CFTC
of exchanges' rules and products. The new law allowed regulated
exchanges to list futures contracts upon a written self-certification that
such products complied with the requirements of the CEA, as amended.254
Exchanges could also voluntarily request the CFTC's pre-trading approval
for their contracts, which gave them the right to label such contracts as
approved by the CFTC.255

249. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC Approves Action to
Advance Regulatory Reform (Nov. 17, 1999), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press99/opa433999.htm.
250.

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT

OF THE COMMODITY FUTURES COMMISSION STAFF TASK FORCE (2000) [hereinafter NEW
FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/opa/oparegulatoryframework.pdf.
251. The principles-based approach to regulation was made popular by, and became associated
with, the United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority ("FSA"). In the decade before the crisis, the
FSA was widely praised as a "risk-based" and "principles-based" regulator that built a more businessfriendly regulatory environment, which attracted more financial institutions and transactions to
London. See Markham, supra note 236, at 544-47 (describing the prevailing attitudes toward the
FSA's principles-based regulatory approach before and after the crisis).
252. NEW FRAMEWORK, supranote 250, at 14.

253. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, H.R. 5660, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000).
The CFMA created several tiers of contract markets, subject to different levels of regulatory oversight.
In addition to fully regulated "designated contract markets" ("DCMs"), the statute created a new
category of a "derivatives trade execution facility" ("DTEF") that was subject to less stringent
regulation. 7 U.S.C. § 7a (2000). Finally, certain markets could qualify as "exempt boards of trade"
subject only to the anti-fraud and anti-manipulation provisions of the CEA. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-3(a) (2000).
254. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(1).
255. 7 U.S.C. § 7a-2(c)(2)(A). Curiously, Rainer submitted his resignation from the post of the
CFTC Chairman on December 20, 2000, only five days after Congress passed the CFMA, in order to
return to private industry. See Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, CFTC Chairman
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These fundamental changes in the market profile, dynamics, and the
regulatory framework put the traditional notion of commercial utility of
futures contracts under an increasing strain. Nevertheless, even the postCFMA futures regulation retained a strong built-in anti-speculative
tendency. Thus, under the CFMA, regulated exchanges do not have to get
separate designation for each futures contract, but must comply with the
applicable core principles.2 56 One such core principle requires an exchange
to list "only contracts that are not readily susceptible to manipulation."
Potential for market manipulation is particularly high where a futures
instrument is designed primarily as an instrument of speculative
investment. The revised Guideline No. 1, which provided guidance to
exchanges seeking voluntary pre-approval of their contracts, retained the
same basic requirements with respect to showing the economic function of
the proposed contracts as a hedging or pricing mechanism for the
underlying commodity markets. 5 In addition, the CFMA retained the
requirement that exchanges establish position limits for speculators in
order to "reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or
congestion." 259 Thus, even the greatly financialized, globalized, and
liberalized futures markets, which are very different from the futures
markets of the 1920s, cannot entirely extricate themselves from the
underlying cash markets and the policy goal of preventing potential harm
to such markets from excessive financial speculation.26 0
D. Learningfrom Experience: Politics,Precaution,and Efficiency
Despite their many differences, the experiences of the FDA, REACH,
and the CFTC allow us to draw some potentially relevant generalizations.
One important insight is the central role of interest group dynamics and
political factors in determining how robust and successful the product
approval regime is in practice. One of the most bitterly contested issues is

William J. Rainer Resigns (Dec. 20, 2000), available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/pressOO/opa448000.htm. While it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions, the changes that took place during Rainer's
tenure at the CFTC and the timing of his resignation suggest that his mission at the agency was to
accomplish a comprehensive deregulatory reform.

256. 7 U.S.C. §7(d).
257. 7 U.S.C. §7(d)(3).
258. See supra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
259. 7 U.S.C. §7(d)(5).
260. The Dodd-Frank Act significantly amended the CEA, primarily to reflect the new clearing
and trading requirements applicable to certain standardized derivatives. See Dodd-Frank Act, Title VII,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1955 (codified in scattered sections of 7 and 15 U.S.C.). However, an
analysis of these amendments is beyond the scope of this Article.
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the length of the approval process, as the industry actors protest the delay
in their product marketing. In the futures industry, the exchanges
successfully argued that the CFTC's contract designation process hurt
their ability to compete with OTC derivatives and foreign futures markets.
Their political lobbying has finally led to the elimination of the mandatory
contract designation requirement. Similarly, pharmaceutical companies
fight against what they see as unreasonable delays in approving new drugs
by the overly cautious FDA. On the other hand, the EC's ability to
introduce an ambitious program that mandates massive and costly testing
for all existing high-volume chemicals, despite the industry's resistance,
exemplifies the power of a political commitment to making the world safer
for human beings and their environment. The industry's complaints about
the exorbitant costs, while certainly affecting how the REACH program
operates, failed to stop the EU authorities from enacting the regulation.
In all of these cases, the industry groups' political lobbying was
particularly successful when they invoked a sufficiently strong
countervailing public interest. Thus, pharmaceutical firms were able to
shift power away from the FDA only when they mobilized patient
advocacy groups to push for faster approval of certain drugs by the FDA,
in the interests of patients who could potentially benefit from those drugs.
Similarly, in the late 1990s, commodity futures exchanges made global
competitiveness and efficiency of U.S. financial markets their battle cry in
the struggle for repeal of the mandatory contract designation requirements.
These legitimate public interest arguments provided a normative
alternative to the policies underlying the statutory product approval
schemes.
Yet, the FDA drug approval regime remains beyond a serious threat of
abolition, despite the increasing pressure from pharmaceutical firms and
patient advocates to change the agency's practices. Although REACH is
still in the early stages of implementation, there is hardly any doubt that it
is going forward. By contrast, the CFTC's mandatory contract designation
was dismantled under industry pressure and without much public
attention. The substance of the underlying policy goals may explain, at
least partly, the difference in their relative viability.26 Thus, both REACH
and the FDA's system of new drug approval serve the purpose that is
difficult to contest politically: protection of human life and health. These

261. There may also be important differences in the regulatory capacity and culture of these
different agencies, the structural context in which these agencies operate, and a variety of other factors
that affect their respective ability to enforce statutory requirements in practice. These issues, however,
are not directly relevant for the purposes of the present discussion.
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regulatory regimes embody, with some variations, the model of explicitly
precautionary risk regulation. The CFTC's contract designation scheme
was aimed primarily at preventing excessive speculation that increased
chances of market manipulation. That policy priority, however, is highly
contestable and vulnerable to competing visions of "public good"
advanced by the financial services industry. To the extent the CFTC's
product approval scheme was conceptualized primarily as a matter of
market efficiency, it had a much weaker normative basis to support its
continuation as a socially desirable precautionary measure, especially in
the face of concerted private efforts to deregulate.
It is reasonable to conclude that one of the critical factors in designing
any product approval regime is a clear articulation and justification of
policy priorities that such regime seeks to implement. It is, however, a
complicated task that involves potentially difficult political choices. This
is particularly true to the extent a proposed product approval scheme is
structured similarly to the CFTC's pre-2000 model. Given the high degree
of contestability of policy priorities in financial services regulation, it is
critical to assert clearly the normative basis on which the proposed product
approval system would operate and to address explicitly the competing
public and private interests. Reflecting key lessons of the recent crisis, this
new normative paradigm should explicitly incorporate both the principle
of precautionary risk regulation and the goal of enhancing economic and
market efficiency and utility by reducing excessive speculation and
arbitrage. An unequivocal statement of these overriding policy priorities
may not eliminate political opposition to the proposal entirely, but may
enhance the regulatory regime's ability to withstand it in the long run.
Of course, it is easy to overdraw the parallels between these three
models of product approval regulation and an idea of instituting a
licensing regime for complex financial products. Significant differences in
the nature of the regulated activity, the structure of the regulated industry,
and the dynamics between private market participants and government
regulators limit our ability to emulate unique features of any particular
regime in a different regulatory realm. For instance, one of the central
elements of both the FDA regime and REACH program is the requirement
of pre-market testing of drugs and chemicals. In both cases, companies
must produce scientific data to demonstrate that their products do not pose
unacceptable risks. Although the validity of specific scientific claims is
often uncertain and disputed, as a general matter, regulatory decisions to
grant or deny market entry fundamentally rest on an objective
experimental basis. In the area of financial services regulation,
experimental testing is generally not feasible and mathematical modeling
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is not fully reliable as the basis for decision-making. Even the CFTC's
experience with mandatory approval of futures may not be directly
applicable to the broader universe of financial products. Futures contracts
were created and submitted for approval by a small number of futures
exchanges, self-regulatory organizations whose interests were more clearly
aligned with the public interest in protecting market integrity. Dealing
with a far greater number of diverse private firms whose interests are not
so aligned may fundamentally alter the regulatory dynamics and introduce
a different set of challenges.
Finally, it is important to remember that none of the three models of
product licensing examined above directly targeted systemic risk as the
main object of regulation. Devising a regime of financial product approval,
which explicitly seeks to minimize systemic risk posed by private
economic activities, is a uniquely challenging task. Nevertheless, even
though none of these three regulatory schemes is a perfect analogy,
understanding their basic features is helpful in framing the discussion of
whether-and, more importantly, how-a product approval regime can
work in the financial services sector.
III. MANDATORY APPROVAL OF COMPLEX FINANCIAL PRODUCTS:
CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITIES

This Part examines the potential structure and process of approval
regulation for complex financial products. It does not purport to present a
complete prescription for immediate action. Rather, it is an intellectual
experiment, an attempt to push the boundaries of what is conceivable and
start outlining the basic contours of a new ex ante regulatory approach to
controlling systemic risk.
A product approval regime envisioned here targets one of the core
causes of systemic risk in the financial services sector: strategic
complexity introduced into the system by financial intermediaries
primarily for the purposes of extracting higher rents and enabling
excessive speculation and regulatory arbitrage.262 This Part discusses key
elements of a statutory scheme establishing such a regime, and identifies
potential problems with designing and implementing it in practice. Despite
the remaining open questions and feasibility challenges, the proposed
system of mandatory pre-approval for complex financial products may
serve as an effective gatekeeping device that limits socially useless

262. See supra notes 32 36 and accompanying text.
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financial engineering and offers a potentially powerful new solution to the
seemingly intractable problem of systemic risk regulation.
A. Licensing of Complex FinancialProducts:Could It Work?
It is difficult to articulate in full all of the important details of a new
regulatory mechanism for pre-approval of complex financial products.
Many instruments and transactions that would be subject to this regime are
currently regulated under different schemes, and some may not be
regulated in a meaningful way at all. Many instruments cross the
functional lines among various economic and regulatory categories of
products, which further complicates the task of formulating clear
definitions. Today's financial markets bring together a variety of
participants that often pursue complex trading and investment strategies
blurring the boundaries among issuers and investors, lenders and
borrowers, market-makers and end-users. Finally, as a result of the
enactment and ongoing implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, the entire
regulatory structure is currently in a state of flux, as the new and old
agencies are trying to map out their new responsibilities and substantive
rules.263
In this context, designing a workable system of product approval
regulation presents substantial challenges. As the first step toward that
goal, this section outlines the key elements of such a system and, to the
extent precise definitions are hard to formulate, attempts to sketch out
some basic principles for approaching that task. Inevitably, this is more of
an exercise in creative thinking than a detailed legislative proposal.
1. Purposes and CriteriaofProductApproval
The overarching policy objective of the proposed product approval
regime should be to control the proliferation of complex financial products
that potentially pose heightened systemic risk. As a corollary to that
policy, the new regulatory regime should explicitly aim at preventing
excessive speculation and reducing regulatory arbitrage in the financial
sector. It is critical that the enabling statute clearly establishes that, in the

263. While it may be possible to build a financial product approval scheme into the emerging
post-Dodd-Frank regulatory structure, doing so may create internal inconsistencies and redundancies
and potentially compromise the integrity of the proposed regime. Fundamentally, the proposal
advanced here is an alternative, rather than a supplement, to the Dodd-Frank Act. Therefore, the
following discussion assumes that Congress will have to pass a new statute establishing the proposed
product approval scheme and mandating the necessary changes to the broader regulatory framework.
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absence of compelling policy reasons to do otherwise, these goals take
precedence over any considerations based on the economic interests of
private market participants.264
This is a different set of objectives than ensuring the safety of financial
products for their users or consumers, as proposed by Stiglitz, Carpenter,
Bar-Gill, and Warren. 265 One of the criticisms of their proposals was the
inherent difficulty of defining the concept of "safety," especially given its
relative nature. Thus, a certain level of risk associated with a product may
be "unsafe" for one category of consumers but "safe" for another,
depending on their financial sophistication and resources. One potential
solution is to mandate full disclosure warning prospective consumers of a
product's risks, but allow so-called "off-label" use.266 This solution,
however, may undermine the integrity of the safety oriented product
approval regime by allowing potentially unsafe products to enter the
market. In the financial market, this could cause potentially irreversible
damage to systemic stability. Framing the policy goals of the mandatory
financial product licensing regime in terms of systemic risk associated
with strategic complexity, financial speculation, and arbitrage removes
this problem of differentiating among target users of a financial
instrument. Because the regime proposed here focuses explicitly on
protection of the legitimate public interest in reducing systemic risk, it
should deflect criticisms of excessively "paternalistic" government
interference with individual market participants' choices.26 7
The key objective of the product licensing review should be to evaluate
each complex financial product from functional, institutional, and policy
perspectives. Regulatory approval should be granted only if the
application meets a three-part statutory standard: (1) an "economic
purpose" test, which would place the burden of proving the commercial
and social utility of each proposed financial instrument on the financial
institutions seeking approval; (2) an "institutional capacity" test, which
would require a review of the applicant firm's ability to monitor and

264. Arguments based on "market efficiency" are often employed to promote private industry
actors' profit-enhancing interests. Economic or market efficiency is a normative concept, despite its
deliberately cultivated appearance of political neutrality and scientific objectivity: it reflects and
presumes certain configurations of economic and political power as the "natural" state of market. For
an insightful discussion of this issue, see SUNSTEIN, supranote 70.
265. See supra Part IC.
266. See Carpenter,supra note 108.
267. To the extent the government seeks to protect a generalized public interest that private parties
are not in a position to protect, the government is inherently "paternalistic." Legal and regulatory
mandates routinely override individual preferences for various public policy reasons.
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manage the risks of the proposed product effectively; and (3) a "systemic
effects" test, which would require a finding that approval of the proposed
product does not pose an unacceptable risk of increasing systemic
vulnerability and does not raise significant public policy concerns.
a. The "EconomicPurpose" Test
First, the applying financial institution would have to make an
affirmative showing that the proposed complex financial instrument has a
bona fide economic purpose that promotes productive enterprise and does
not merely provide another means of financial speculation or regulatory
arbitrage. The goal of the product approval regime is to discourage
financial institutions from creating and marketing complex financial
instruments, where the benefits of such complexity for the economy and
broader society do not outweigh potential increases in systemic risk. Thus,
this test specifically targets strategic complexity that enables market actors
to avoid regulatory constraints, hide the true extent of their leverage, and
engage in financial speculation.
The main conceptual difficulty here is defining precisely what
constitutes an impermissibly "speculative" investment. Speculation is
often an elusive concept.268 Because of the inherent uncertainty of future
returns on any financial investment, all investing activity may be viewed
as a form of speculation. 269 At the same time, it is hard to deny a common
intuition that some forms of speculative investment are fundamentally
different from traditional investing, not only in terms of their economic
motivation, but also in moral terms.270 While this definitional difficulty is
a legitimate theoretical concern, it is not necessary to provide a statutory
definition of speculation to establish an effective product approval regime.

268. See Stout, supra note 240, at 735. See also Timothy Lynch, Gambling by Another Name? The
Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives (Ind. Univ. Maurer School of Law-Bloomington Legal
Research Paper No. 188, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
1788219&rec=1&srcabs=1785634.
269. The basic distinction between "speculation" and "hedging" as the key categories of potential
uses of complex financial products, such as derivatives, may be used to draw the line between
permissible and impermissible transactions. See Posner & Weyl, supra note 9, at 13-15 (discussing
how the regulator would estimate and balance potential hedging and speculative market demand for a
product). This approach, however, tends to over-simplify the relationship between these two
categories. For instance, what should be done with a product that is as a bona fide hedge for an
underlying speculative position? It may not be readily ascertainable that a specific position that is
being hedged is a speculative one. Moreover, there may be a long chain of intermediate "hedging"
transactions that ultimately build up to a highly speculative bet.
270. Stout, supra note 240; Hazen, supra note 195.
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Instead, the goal should be to outline the key factors which the regulator
would have to analyze as part of the product review.
To meet the economic purpose test, an applicant firm will have to:
(1) identify the intended market for the proposed financial product and
describe potential users of the product; (2) show that the product will
fulfill a specific business need of potential "product users," which existing
financial products fail to fulfill; and (3) demonstrate that this legitimate
business need significantly outweighs any potential uses of the product for
speculative investment or regulatory arbitrage as the core motivation for
the product user (or the applicant firm) to enter into the proposed
-271
transaction.
Who the intended users are is an important element of the inquiry, as it
is closely tied to the determination of the core economic function of the
proposed financial product. As a general rule, financial instruments
designed either to allow for hedging of pre-existing risk incurred by the
user in the course of its ordinary business or to otherwise enhance the
user's ability to conduct productive economic activity would pass the
economic purpose test.272 However, it may be necessary to create a
rebuttable presumption against approving financial products whose
identified prospective users include only financial institutions that
ordinarily engage in financial risk management and transfer as part of their
core business-banks and their affiliates, securities or insurance firm, and
hedge funds or other private investment vehicles. The applicant firm can
overcome this presumption by showing that, for example, the proposed
financial instrument would enable a financial intermediary to hedge a
specific financial risk arising directly out of its core business: providing
capital to productive economic enterprise. 2 3

271. The statutory burden of meeting this test will operate to reduce socially useless financial
innovation driven primarily by supply-side incentives of financial intermediaries. See Awrey, supra
note 4.
272. Hedging pre-existing risk is a core economic function of derivatives instruments. See, e.g.,
Krawiec, supra note 16; Romano, supra note 16. Loan securitization is an example of a financial
transaction that enhances the originating banks' ability to remove loans from their balance sheets and
free up more funds for increased lending to businesses and individuals, presumably for use in
productive economic activity. To the extent a particular securitization transaction serves to achieve
that goal, it has a valid economic purpose.
273. Importantly, the application would have to specify that, whenever used for hedging purposes,
the proposed product is structured as a direct hedge narrowly tailored to a specific risk and does not
create any additional risks likely to be speculative in nature. See, e.g., Lynch, supra note 268. It is also
important to consider whether the dealer-to-dealer hedging of large portfolio risks should be subject to
additional restrictions and conditions. There may be a legitimate policy reason to discourage such
dealer-to-dealer hedging as significantly increasing systemic interconnectedness, complexity, and
opacity. See supra Part I.A. There may be a strong argument for forcing dealers in complex financial
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It is important that the application describes the target market for the
product and the intended economic purpose of the product with sufficient
specificity. 274 For instance, it would not be enough to describe the intended
users of the proposed product in generic terms as "long-term investors
searching for yield." Similarly, a claim that the proposed instrument would
allow financial institutions to broaden their client base, get higher trading
returns, or receive higher fees would not be enough of an economic
purpose to justify approval. Vague claims to the effect that the product
would improve these actors'-or their clients'-ability to manage risk in
their existing portfolio would not be a sufficient basis for approval. The
key is a reasonably specific and direct link to some productive economic
activity that exists outside the confines of financial markets.
Ultimately, the economic purpose standard is a "facts and
circumstances" test2.276 While it is difficult to give a clean theoretical
definition of what types of products should not be approved as lacking a
bona fide economic purpose, in reality, it is often not so difficult to see
what is going on. For example, if a transaction between a hedge fund and a
dealer-bank is structured as a total return swap tied to performance of a
basket of equity stock, the dealer-bank applying for approval of that
transaction will have to explain what the economic substance of that swap
is, and why it is necessary for the hedge fund to enter into that swap
instead of borrowing money from a bank and investing it in the underlying
stock directly. The only real explanation for such a transaction is likely to

instruments to manage their risks primarily through reducing their leverage, holding more capital and
liquid reserves, demanding more and better collateral, and instituting more conservative counterparty
and other risk management procedures.
274. Financial institutions may also be required to provide good-faith estimates of the volume of
transactions they expect to conduct. If the actual volume exceeds the original estimates, the institution
would have to request additional approval for the excess deal flow.
275. It may be desirable to create an explicit presumption against financial instruments where the
rights to payments are separated from the ultimate underlying assets by a series of intermediate
instruments. Examples of such multi-layered complex financial instruments are so-called CDO2 and
CDO3 that invest in pools of interests in other CDOs. See Re-securitizing CDOs, RISK.NET (Aug. 1,
2004), http://www.risk.net/credit/feature/1522744/re-securitising-cdos (discussing various types of resecuritizations). This approach would effectively prohibit multi-layered securitizations, which greatly
contributed to the latest financial crisis. See TURNER REVIEW, supra note 11, at 15-16 (discussing the
role of securitized credit in increasing systemic risk).
276. In that sense, the "economic purpose" test envisioned here differs from the simple
quantitative market analysis of "social utility" proposed by Posner and Weyl. Cf Posner & Weyl,
supra note 9, at 13-15. As most model-based quantitative tests, their approach appears elegantly
simple and purports to offer a degree of certainty inherently lacking in a context-sensitive "facts and
circumstances" analysis. Yet, as most judges, regulators, and practicing lawyers would attest,
achieving the "right" practical result in a complex situation often involves working through the messy
pile of individual facts and circumstances.
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be some form of regulatory arbitrage and the hedge fund's search for
higher leverage to boost profits from betting on stock prices. Unless the
applicant is able to convince the regulator that (1) the proposed swap
would produce tangible economic benefits (other than generating profits
for the counterparties) or directly contribute to some productive economic
activity, and (2) such socially desirable effects are significant enough to
overcome the statutory presumption against complexity driven by
speculation and arbitrage, that total return swap would not pass the
economic purpose test.
The firms will have to monitor on an ongoing basis the markets for

their approved products and report any significant changes in the market
composition and uses of the relevant products, as these changes may alter
considerations on which the original approval grant was based.2 77 By tying
regulatory approval not only to a broad category of transactions-such as
swaps, equity options, or mortgage-backed securities-but also to specific
target uses and target users, the proposed regime will ensure continuous
generation and collection of valuable information on important market
trends. 278 This would potentially enable the regulators to monitor these
trends more effectively, so that they are more likely to react in a timely
manner when familiar financial instruments start morphing into something
different in terms of their functions and risk profile.279
It is difficult to overestimate the information-producing potential of the
proposed product approval regime. It would effectively require financial
institutions to provide complete quantitative and qualitative disclosure and
analysis of their activities as dealers and market-makers in complex
financial products. That alone would provide the regulators with
meaningful access to internal business and market information that is
currently unavailable to them. This burden-shifting mechanism would go a

277. This is an important element of the proposed regime, insofar as it would help to detect
significant post-approval changes in the risk profile of the existing financial products as a result of
financial innovation and regulatory arbitrage. For an insightful analysis of this phenomenon in the
context of securitization, see Adam J. Levitin et al., The Dodd-FrankAct and Housing Finance: Can It
Restore Private Risk Capitalto the Securitization Market?, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 155 (2012) (arguing
that the informational opacity in securitization markets was the key cause of the housing market
collapse); See also Levitin & Wachter, supra note 35 (arguing that the recent U.S. housing bubble was
a result of the fundamental shift in the mortgage finance market from regulated to unregulated, privatelabel securitization).
278. In many respects, this feature of the regime would make it similar to the FDA's postapproval market monitoring and continuing generation of empirical data on safety and efficacy of new
drugs. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
279. The transformation of traditional residential mortgages and relatively straightforward
mortgage-backed securitizations into a complex form of financial speculation provides an example of
such dynamics. See supra note 277.
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long way toward correcting both the informational asymmetries between
the regulators and the industry and the existing incentive structure that
encourages socially harmful risk-taking by financial market actors. In
effect, the proposed approach would reformulate the currently
dysfunctional concept of cost-benefit analysis of financial services
regulation as a more risk-based and socially conscious cost-benefit
280
analysis of financial services2. Importantly, it would also allocate the
duty to produce information necessary to conduct such analysis on the
party that has full access to such information.
The proposed regime, however, goes far beyond mere information

gathering. 281 By putting the economic purpose test at the center of the
approval process, the scheme envisioned here builds upon the traditional
pre-2000 CEA approach that recognized the heightened potential of
derivative contracts to be used for speculative purposes. The present
proposal takes that approach to a different level, reflecting the overarching
policy goal of reducing strategic complexity and systemic risk in financial
markets.
b. The "InstitutionalCapacity" Test
The second part of the statutory standard would require the applicant to
demonstrate its internal organizational, operational, and financial capacity

280. In 1981, President Reagan issued an Executive Order requiring administrative agencies to
submit to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) complete regulatory plans and cost-benefit analyses for all of their "major rules." See
Steven Croley, White House Review ofAgency Rulemaking: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 821, 824-26 (2003) (outlining the history and impact of Executive Orders 12291 and 12498 on
OMB). All regulatory agencies other than those specifically exempted under the Paperwork Reduction
Act, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Star. 2812 (1980) (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501 3520), are required to
submit to OIRA drafts of their proposed rules that constitute "significant" regulatory action (generally,
rules that have an expected annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more) for review. See
Croley, supra, at 825. This mandatory cost-benefit analysis of regulatory actions tends to overstate the
more easily quantifiable "costs" to private market actors and understate the far more diffuse and often
unquantifiable "benefits" to the public. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized
Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1260 (2006) (criticizing the deregulatory
impact of cost-benefit review of agency rules by OIRA); Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHT. L. REV. 1355 (2009) (discussing the drawbacks of cost-benefit
analysis for environmental regulation). Moreover, there is evidence that the financial services industry
is using the mandatory cost-benefit analysis of agency rules as a procedural tool to slow down the
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., Silla Brush, U.S. Regulators Paralyzed by CostBenefit Suits, Chilton Says, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0308/u-s-regulators-paralyzed-by-cost-benefit-suits-chilton-says.html (quoting a CFTC member, Bart
Chilton, as stating that the CFTC is battling the financial industry's lawsuits challenging the agency's
new rules on speculation limits as inadequately supported by cost-benefit analysis).
281. For a discussion of potential benefits and disadvantages of the purely informational prescreening of financial products, see infra Part Ill.B.4.
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to monitor and manage risks associated with the proposed product. This
requirement is similar to the CFTC's review of exchanges' internal
capacity to support markets for a new futures contract. 282
Again, this part of the test ties regulatory approval to the specific
context in which a particular product would be used. Thus, even if the
proposed financial product may have proven economic and social utility,
as a general matter, it may not be appropriate for a particular financial
institution that fails to prove its ability to understand, identify, measure,
monitor, and manage potential risks the product poses to the institution's
own financial health, as well as to the financial well-being of the product's
users and overall market stability.
To meet this test, the applicant would have to satisfy certain capital
adequacy or similar requirements limiting an entity's ability to incur
leverage. In addition to meeting the applicable overall regulatory capital
requirements, regulators may require a higher capital buffer to support the
specific proposed financial transaction and related market activities. It is
important, however, not to overestimate the regulatory capital measures as
effective indicators of a firm's financial soundness. Additional factors to
be considered may include (1) the firm's overall business and risk profile,
(2) the relationship between the proposed activity and the rest of the firm's
business and resources (including human and technological resources),
(3) internal systems of risk management and regulatory compliance, and
(4) regulatory and compliance record and history of enforcement against
the firm or its affiliated entities. It is important to review and evaluate
whether the firm has effective and thoughtful risk management policies
and procedures in place, designed specifically for the proposed financial
product or activity.
An important consideration in this respect is the actual or potential
conflict of interest a particular financial institution may face in connection
with the proposed activity. The inquiry at this point should not be limited
only to the firm's general ability to handle the economic demands of
dealing in the specific product. It is also necessary to assess how the
proposed activity may alter the firm's economic incentives and overall
business strategy, and whether or not that change potentially poses
reputational risks to the firm or raises significant concerns about broader
market integrity.283 To put it simply, the key question has to be, "Do we
want this particular institution to trade and deal in this particular product?"

282. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
283. One example highlighting the importance of assessing this type of risk both to the firm's
reputation and to the broader market integrity is Goldman Sachs' infamous "Big Short" strategy in
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This institutional test would also involve assessing the extent to which
the proposed activity is likely to increase the size or systemic significance
of an applicant firm so that it becomes "too big to fail" ("TBTF") or "too
interconnected to fail" ("TITF"). While a product approval mechanism
alone is not likely to solve the TBTF/TITF problem, it may help to control
it by limiting financial intermediaries' ability to expand trading volumes
and create additional linkages and channels of contagion in the financial
markets.284
c. The "Systemic Effects" Test
Finally, in order to get regulatory approval for its new complex
financial product, the applicant firm will have to demonstrate that such a
product does not pose potentially unacceptable systemic risk or is
otherwise likely to increase the vulnerability of the financial system. This
broadly stated requirement aims to give the regulator statutory authority to
consider a wide variety of potentially relevant factors-and public policy
considerations-that may not be directly included in the description of the
product or the immediate market needs.
For instance, this part of the statutory test would operate to prevent
transactions like the infamous ABACUS 2007 AC-1 deal, whereby
Goldman Sachs structured and marketed a synthetic collateralized debt
obligation ("CDO")285 referencing a pool of U.S. subprime residential
mortgage-backed securities. The CDO was structured specifically to
enable Paulson & Co., one of the world's largest hedge funds and
Goldman Sachs' client, to take a large short position against subprime
mortgage-backed securities, which allowed the fund to collect significant
profits from the collapse of the U.S. housing market.286 If Goldman Sachs

early 2007. One of the major CDO originators, Goldman Sachs accumulated a large short position in
the mortgage-backed assets it was aggressively securitizing and marketing at the same time. See THE
LEVIN REPORT, supra note 11, at 376-636.
284. It may be desirable to subject TBTF institutions to stricter scrutiny in the product approval
process, with the goal of discouraging them from engaging in socially useless financial innovation.
Thus, these large and sophisticated firms would have to meet a higher standard of proof with respect to
their institutional capacity to manage the entire spectrum of risks in connection with the proposed
activity.
285. A synthetic CDO references a pool of assets that consists of credit default swaps (CDS)
instead of actual loans or securities. See Michael S. Gibson, Understandingthe Risk ofSynthetic CDOs
(July 2004), availableat http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2004/200436/200436pap.pdf
286. In April 2010, the SEC brought a lawsuit against Goldman Sachs, accusing the firm of
intentionally misleading investors about the true risk profile of the ABACUS CDO and Paulson's
direct involvement in the selection of the reference assets in the CDO. Press Release, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $ 550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to
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had to disclose the details of this transaction in order to receive a prior
regulatory approval, as proposed in this Article, it would have faced
significant difficulties in meeting both the economic purpose and the
systemic effects tests. Even if such a CDO was structured not for
Paulson's hedge fund but for commercial companies seeking to hedge
their bona fide business exposure to residential housing prices (such as
construction companies or real estate developers), the potentially
destabilizing effect of this transaction on the U.S. housing market would
have allowed the regulator to block the deal from going forward.2 87
This test would explicitly bring in broader public policy considerations
that the proposed new product potentially implicates. Many existing
statutes mandate that financial regulators exercise their discretion only if
doing so is in the public interest. This part of the product approval process
is designed to allow for this type of deliberation, where the applicant firm
bears the burden of proving that the financial instrument it seeks to market
is not likely to have a negative impact on broader socioeconomic policies
and political goals.288
2. Scope and Structure
Designing a system of mandatory product approval for complex
financial instruments raises fundamental structural questions. Which
financial products and transactions should be subject to the approval
regime? Who should be required to apply for regulatory approval of a

Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010123.htm. In July 2010, Goldman Sachs settled the SEC's charges and agreed to pay $550 million and
reform its business practices. Id.
287. The existing legal theories and concepts, such as investor protection or fiduciary duty, did not
fully capture what was "wrong" with Goldman Sachs' conduct in structuring the ABACUS deal. The
proposed product approval scheme offers a potential alternative to using these and other traditional
concepts in corporate and securities laws to fit more complex situations.
288. A quintessential example of a financial product banned on public policy grounds are
terrorism futures, conceived in 2003 by Pentagon as a market-based predictor of the level of risk posed
by terrorist attacks. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, The Furor Over 'Terrorism Futures,' WASH.
POST, July 31, 2003, at Al9. As the proponents of this product explained,
The idea was simple: By creating a market in which people can buy and sell contracts that
pay $100 if certain political events occur in the Middle East, we can infer from the price of
such securities the probability of these outcomes. By explicitly pricing such risks, we can
better understand them and better respond to them.
Id. Despite this rhetoric, Congress discarded this idea on public policy grounds. In July 2011, the
CFTC adopted a rule pursuant to section 745 of the Dodd-Frank Act prohibiting the listing and trading
of contracts referencing "terrorism, assassination, war, gaming, or an activity that is unlawful under
any State or Federal law." 17 C.F.R. §40.11 (a(1) (2011).
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specific product? Finally, who should be in charge of administering the
approval scheme?
a. "CoveredProducts"
Defining what exactly qualifies as a "complex financial product" is
perhaps the single most challenging task in designing an approval regime.
On the one hand, there is a danger of creating an over-inclusive definition
that may have a chilling effect on products with relatively low potential
for causing systemic disruptions or increasing strategic complexity. On the
other hand, by stressing specific product characteristics, this definition
may be dangerously under-inclusive. Ultimately, developing a full set of
detailed legal definitions is a task for lawmakers drafting new legislation
and regulatory agencies implementing it. The following discussion aims
only to sketch out possible approaches to that problem.
As the basis for developing a statutory definition, it is possible to start
with a group of "Covered Products" that includes: (1) derivative
instruments and structured products; 28 9 (2) asset-backed securities and
structures set up to issue such securities; and (3) any other financial
transaction or instrument that, alone or in combination with other financial
transactions or instruments, is determined by the regulator to constitute a
"complex financial product" subject to mandatory approval. 290 An
alternative approach may be to define Covered Product broadly as any
financial instrument or transaction and provide exceptions from that allinclusive category for (1) certain traditional deposit, credit, and investment
products; 291 and (2) any other financial instrument or transaction that the

289. There is no single legal definition of a "structured product." The term is generally used to
refer to a financial instrument with payoff "structured" to reflect specific risk exposure. A typical
example is a debt security with a derivative component.
290. This catch-all category is designed to provide the regulator with the necessary flexibility to
extend approval requirements to new types of complex financial products thatmay emerge in the
future.
291. The statute may define each of these traditional financial products by enumerating specific
criteria, using various existing legal definitions in banking and securities laws as a starting point. The
key criteria, however, should be the absence of any derivative component, so that the value of the
instrument and the payment rights and obligations are calculated on a simple basis and not by
reference to the value of any other asset. Thus, a deposit account that pays interest at a specified fixed
rate or a variable rate linked to certain commonly used benchmark interest rates would qualify as a
"Traditional Deposit Product." By contrast, a certificate of deposit with interest payments linked to the
performance of a broad-based stock index would not constitute a Traditional Deposit Product and
would be subject to pre-approval, unless exempted by regulation. Similarly, shares of common or
preferred stock, where the return on such shares is not "structured" to create a specific risk/return
profile, would qualify as a "Traditional Investment Product," whereas an asset-backed security would
not fall in that category.
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regulators may exempt by regulation.
Another problem is how to define what constitutes a "product" that
requires a separate regulatory approval. A financial institution cannot
apply for a blanket pre-approval of all "swaps" or "equity swaps" and
proceed to structure and market a wide variety of such instruments with
different risk profiles. Thus, one of the critical tasks in designing the new
regulatory regime is to develop a set of criteria for determining when a
particular instrument has sufficiently unique features to make it a separate
"product." As a first approximation, that list of factors should include key
terms related to payment and other significant rights and obligations of the

parties to the transaction, the nature of reference assets, and the intended
uses for the instrument and target markets. To the extent any new version
of a previously approved Covered Product contains a significant change in
any of these terms, the financial institution planning to market it would
have to make a written determination whether the changes alter the
Covered Product's key features or overall risk profile significantly enough
so as to require a separate regulatory approval.293
Finding a workable solution to these definitional problems-where and
how exactly to draw the lines between separate "products" and which of
those products should be subject to mandatory licensing-may be the key
to the viability of the proposed scheme. Among other things, it would
determine the volume of deals to be reviewed and approved by the
regulator under the new regime. It is difficult to estimate the exact
numbers at this point. However, given the size and diversity of today's
financial markets, it is likely that regulators may be overwhelmed by the
volume of products subject to the new licensing requirements.294
It may be worth considering a specific exemption from mandatory preapproval for Covered Products actively traded on registered and regulated
exchanges that meet certain criteria. Such an exemption would make the
implementation of the statutory scheme more manageable by carving out a

292. Regulatory discretion to exempt certain financial instruments from the requirement of
mandatory pre-approval is necessary to ensure the flexibility and adaptability of the regulatory regime
in the dynamic market environment. Regulators' discretion, however, must be subject to certain
conditions, both substantive and procedural. Thus, it is important that the regulators do not have the
authority to grant exemptions by individual order or through informal interpretation.
293. If several previously approved Covered Products are used in a complex trading or investment
strategy, that strategy itself may require separate approval as a new Covered Product.
294. This is one of the key differences between the proposed model and the CFTC's pre-CFMA
contract designation scheme. The average volumes of futures that the CFTC had to review and
approve were relatively low. For example, in December 1997, Brooksley Born stated that, since the
spring of that year, exchanges submitted fifteen new contracts for the CFTC's approval. Brooksley
Born, Derivatives and Risk Management: Keynote Address, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 761, 763 (1997).
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broad universe of financial products, including standardized exchangetraded derivatives, with deep and liquid markets. To limit the potential risk
of creating a dangerous loophole, however, it is important to tailor an
exemption for such publicly traded Covered Products in a way that
balances various policy considerations.
The EU's experience with REACH offers valuable insight into
designing a regulatory regime capable of managing a high volume of
products. REACH calibrates regulation of different categories of
chemicals depending on their volume and toxicity. Low-volume, low-risk
substances are generally subject only to registration requirements, while

potentially high-risk chemicals are subject to pre-market approval and
even product bans. It may be desirable to apply a similar "tiered" approach
to licensing complex financial products. For instance, one way to
differentiate among various products is to look at the firms' projections of
the monetary value and volume of deals. If the firm expects to deal and
trade in a particular Covered Product in the aggregate amount exceeding a
certain threshold, it would have to undergo the full approval process and
satisfy all three statutory tests. In all other cases, the proposed Covered
Product would be exempt from pre-approval requirements.' 9 One
potential concern with this approach is that it may be easy to evade
regulation by breaking up big deals into separate transactions to fly under
the regulatory radar.
An alternative approach may be to create different tiers within the
system depending on the characteristics of the financial institution, rather
than the product it intends to market. Thus, all systemically important
financial institutions ("SIFIs") would be subject to the most stringent form
of the product approval regime, which would require them to obtain a
license for all of their Covered Products. Because many SIFIs are likely to
be considered TBTF, it may also be desirable to heighten the scrutiny of
296
their products.26 Smaller, less diversified financial institutions that are less
likely to be systemically significant may be subject to less stringent
product approval requirements. This approach also raises significant
concerns, especially because it is often difficult to identify which entities
are "systemically important" until it is too late.
Another useful and commonly used regulatory technique is to phase in
the application of product approval requirements, targeting the most

295. There can also be an intermediate category of products that require an abbreviated approval
process, so that the firms would either have to satisfy some but not all of the statutory tests or
otherwise bear a lighter burden of proof
296. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
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systemically risky or significant financial products and institutions first
and then gradually expand the scope of the regime to include other
products and actors. This phase-in implementation would potentially allow
for necessary adjustments along the way, as more information on the
practical operation of the new regime becomes available.
There is no guarantee that any of these mechanisms would succeed in
making the proposed product approval regime more manageable without
sacrificing its integrity. Combined with careful definitional carve-outs and
narrowly tailored exemptions, however, they can serve as the basis for
designing a practical solution to that problem.
The mandatory product approval scheme would allow the creation of
an individual identification and tracking system for complex financial
instruments. Under that system, each approved Covered Product would be
assigned a unique alpha-numerical identifier containing the key
information about the product category, the financial institution that
received regulatory approval to market it, and other relevant data.297 This
system would allow consumers and regulators to trace the path of financial
products or trading strategies to the institutions responsible for their
origination. In addition to generating and organizing transactional data, it
may heighten financial institutions' sensitivity to reputational risks
associated with complex financial transactions. This tracking system
would also make it easier for the authorities to conduct investigations and
bring enforcement actions against individual institutions.298

297. This identifier would be similar to the CUSIP (Committee on Uniform Securities
Identification Procedures) number assigned to each class of securities of the U.S. and Canadian
publicly held companies and U.S. government and municipal bonds. The CUSIP system is owned by
the American Bankers Association, administered by Standard & Poor's, and is used to facilitate the
clearing and settlement of securities. See CUSIP Number, U.S. SEC & ExCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec
.gov/answers/cusip.htm (last visited May 12, 2012).
298. One of the problems during the recent financial crisis was that, in many instances of
significant market failures, it was virtually impossible to establish the degree of any individual
institution's fault, as many toxic products were continuously repackaged throughout the system,
spreading and amplifying risk. The conspicuous lack of criminal prosecutions of Wall Street
institutions and executives implicated in questionable deals that led to the crisis continues to draw
significant public criticism and potentially undermines political legitimacy of financial regulation
reforms. See Matt Taibbi, Why Isn t Wall Street in Jail?, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 16, 2011, http://www
.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-isnt-wall-street-in-jail-20110216. In June 2012, the Financial
Stability Board, an international body that coordinates national authorities' efforts to regulate financial
systemic risks, announced an initiative to establish a global Legal Entity Identifier ("LEI") system that
would assign unique alphanumeric identifiers to parties to financial transactions. Fin Stability Bd., A
Global Legal Entity Identifier for Financial Markets (June 8, 2012), available at http://www
.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 120608.pdf. If successfully implemented, the LEI initiative
would make financial transactions more transparent and may serve as the basis for developing a
system of financial product identifiers.
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b. "CoveredInstitutions"
The statute would impose the duty to apply for regulatory approval of
each Covered Product on the "Covered Institution" seeking to introduce
the product into the market. Typically, that would be a financial
intermediary that acts as an originator, issuer, underwriter, structurer,
dealer or market-maker with respect to the Covered Product. In certain
cases, two or more Covered Institutions-the issuer and the underwriter of
a structured note, or the originator and the securitizer of an asset-backed
instrument-may have to submit a joint approval application for the same
Covered Product.299
In principle, the product approval scheme envisioned here aims at
financial intermediaries: commercial banks, securities firms, insurance
companies, and their affiliates or subsidiaries specializing in derivatives
and securitization activities. However, if a non-intermediary institutionsuch as a hedge fund or a commercial company-wants to enter into
complex financial transactions directly with other non-dealer entities, it
would be a Covered Institution and would have to apply for regulatory
approval of its proposed transactions. Such an entity will have to satisfy,
among other things, the institutional capacity test. In effect, that would
make such a fund or company subject to prudential requirements
applicable to financial intermediaries. In other words, anyone can become
an independent player in the markets for complex financial products, as
long as they agree to be regulated for their ability to take on their financial
risks. In practice, however, this approach is likely to preclude "free
dealing" in complex financial instruments.
To strengthen this barrier to entry, it may be desirable to mandate
registration of each Covered Institution as an "Approved Dealer" in the
specific Covered Product. There is a wide range of potential regulatory
requirements that such registration may imply. It may serve merely as a
recording device-a roster of all entities that successfully applied for
approval of specific Covered Products. On the other end of the spectrum,
registration as an Approved Dealer in any single Covered Product may
subject an entity to stringent regulation with respect to its capital and
liquidity levels, limits on leverage, conflicts of interest and affiliate
transactions, internal risk management, customer relations, financial
reporting, and regulatory examinations. Such an extensive regulatory and

299. In these situations, it may make sense for the financial institutions to designate one Covered
Institution as the lead applicant.
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supervisory regime would be largely parallel to the currently separate
regimes for securities broker-dealers, commercial banks, savings
associations, and other regulated intermediaries.300 As a practical matter,
introducing a system of comprehensive regulation and supervision of
Approved Dealers in Covered Products may necessitate a major structural
reorganization of the financial services industry.30 1 Therefore, the
advantages and disadvantages of such a system, and its potential
interaction with the existing regulatory regimes for financial
intermediaries, would require careful consideration and policy analysis.
c. The FinancialProductApproval Commission
An important structural element of the proposed product approval
regime is the choice of where to locate this new regulatory function. One
option would be to grant this new regulatory power to one of the existing
financial regulators. The Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the CFTC are the
most likely candidates for this new role. However, this is likely to create a
variety of complications and potential conflicts with other policy and
regulatory goals of these agencies. The existing organizational culture may
also significantly interfere with their ability to perform this new regulatory
role.
A better option would be to establish a new regulatory agency-the
Financial Product Approval Commission ("FPAC")-charged specifically
with the implementation and administration of the new statutory scheme.
The new agency may be structured in different ways. To enhance its
independence, it may be preferable to set it up as an independent
commission, either multi-member or headed by a single Commissioner. It
is critical that the newly established FPAC has highly skilled and wellcompensated staff, as well as sufficient resources to support the hiring of
outside consultants, if necessary.302

300. The regulatory and supervisory requirements for registered Approved Dealers in Covered
Products may be more stringent than general requirements for banks, securities firms or other financial
intermediaries. For instance, given the heighten potential risks associated with complex financial
instruments, it may be desirable to impose significantly higher capital adequacy and liquidity
requirements on Approved Dealers than those mandated under the Basel III framework. See generally
BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVTsION, BASEL Ill: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR

MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (June 2011), available at http://www.bis.org/

publ/bcbsl89.pdf
301. Financial institutions may respond by "pushing out" the bulk of their structuring and dealing
in complex financial products into separate subsidiaries registered and regulated as Approved Dealers
in Covered Products. To avoid negative effects of further regulatory fragmentation, broader structural
reforms redefining existing regulatory categories may be necessary.
302. An important issue in this respect is the funding model for the new agency. To ensure greater

130

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:63

A more interesting question is the scope of substantive jurisdiction of
the new agency. There may be a strong argument for combining the new
product approval function with the broader oversight of systemic risk in
the financial services sector. The Dodd-Frank Act created a new
interagency body, the Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC"), to
fulfill this function.o3 Reassigning the systemic risk oversight
responsibilities to the FPAC would require a major restructuring of the
Dodd-Frank framework, which may be too disruptive. On the other hand,
there are legitimate reasons to doubt the practical efficacy of the FSOC
and the entire emerging systemic risk regulation regime. Thus, it may be

too early to foreclose a thorough discussion of alternative substantive and
structural solutions to the problem of systemic risk regulation.
Another dilemma arises if the new product approval regime also
involves mandatory registration and comprehensive regulation of
Approved Dealers in Covered Products. To the extent the FPAC
administers this new system of centralized oversight of Approved Dealers,
there may be jurisdictional overlaps and conflicts between the new agency
and the SEC, CFTC, federal and state bank regulators, and state insurance
regulators. Resolving these conflicts is likely to require a fundamental
reorganization of the existing fragmented, silo-based regulation and
supervision of financial intermediaries. This type of institutional reform is
challenging and politically difficult. The idea of regulating and
supervising all financial institutions that create, market, and trade complex
financial products under a single statutory scheme, however, may create
the basis for a much-needed overhaul of the current regulatory structure. 304
Finally, an interesting issue to consider is how the FPAC would
interact with, and affect the functioning of, the recently established CFPB.
There is a fertile ground for extensive cooperation and coordination
between these two agencies. Many Covered Products may directly or

political independence and ample financial resources, it may be desirable to fund the FPAC's activities
through industry assessments. On the other hand, funding through Congressional appropriations may
better insulate the agency from private industry influence.
303. Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 111, 124 Stat. at 1392-94 (codified at 12
U.S.C.A. § 5321 (West Supp. 2011)) (establishing the FSOC). The voting members of the FSOC,
headed by the Secretary of the Treasury, include the heads of the key financial regulatory agencies,
such as the Federal Reserve, the SEC, the CFTC, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

("OCC"). Id.
304. A more general objection to the proposed structure is that the creation of yet another federal
agency would further complicate the already fragmented system of financial services regulation. This
is a legitimate concern that further underscores the importance of broader structural reforms, which
would streamline and reassign jurisdictional functions among various government agencies in a
manner consistent with the realities of today's financial marketplace. A discussion of these broader
reforms is beyond the scope of this Article.
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indirectly affect consumer markets or be directly subject to the CFPB's
jurisdiction. To the extent the CFPB does not possess explicit product
approval powers, however, there is a limited potential for jurisdictional
conflicts between these agencies.
3. ProceduralIssues; Enforcement
Product review and approval is a form of agency adjudication that
would have to satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clauseos and the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA").o6
The enabling statute and the FPAC's rules would set forth the specific and
detailed procedural requirements governing the agency review and
decision-making with respect to product approval applications.o
a. Review Process
The statute would have to specify general timeframes for agency
action. For example, the statute could require that the FPAC make a final
decision on each application-by issuing either an Approval Order or an
Order of Denial-within ninety days of its receipt, but may extend the
review period for up to three additional ninety-day periods, if doing so is
necessary to make a fully informed decision and the agency notifies the
-308
applicant in writing of each extension.
The applicant entity would bear the burden of showing that the
proposed product meets all of the statutory and regulatory criteria for
approval. To facilitate its deliberations, the FPAC would have the right to
request any additional information from the applicant, engage in

305. The agency adjudication would need to satisfy the Due Process Clause, because a decision to
deny approval for a specific product may potentially be viewed as a "deprivation" of the applicant's
"property" rights. See RICHARD . PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 27-39 (2008) (discussing the

applicability of the Due Process Clause to agency adjudications).
306. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (2006). The enabling statute, however, does not need to require the
approval agency to engage in a formal adjudication "on the record after opportunity for agency
hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
307. It is important that the FPAC has extensive rule-making authority in order to be able to
continue adapting the product approval regime to evolving market conditions.
308. The financial industry is likely to resist any such timeframes as unacceptably long. As the
CFTC's experience demonstrates, even a ten-day review period was too much of a delay from the
industry actors' perspective. See supra notes 239-42 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, it is crucial
to allow the regulator an opportunity to complete the review process giving full consideration to all
interests involved, including the public interest in protecting systemic stability. In many situations, the
FPAC may arrive at a decision well before the maximum statutory review period expires. In addition,
applicants may have a right to request an expedited review of their application, on the basis of specific
evidence that such an expedited review is warranted.
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consultations with outside experts, hold formal or informal hearings, and
take any other action it deems necessary. By submitting an application for
product approval, each Covered Institution would be deemed to have
agreed to cooperate with the FPAC and to submit all additional
information, as requested by the agency, and failure to do so would
constitute grounds for an automatic Order of Denial.
In its discretion, the FPAC would have the authority to impose
conditions on approval of any specific product. For instance, the FPAC
could require the applicant to make specific changes to the terms of the
proposed financial product. This element of the proposed scheme is
similar to the pre-2000 CEA provisions that granted the CFTC the power
to mandate changes to futures contracts. 0 Unlike the CFTC, however, the
FPAC would merely condition approval on the applicant's compliance
with the agency's request for specific changes; it would not have the
authority to mandate such changes unilaterally. If the applicant and the
agency fail to agree on the necessary changes, the agency would have
discretion to issue an Order of Denial.
When necessary, the FPAC would have the power to grant a
conditional approval allowing the applicant to test-market the proposed
product for a specified period of time, subject to various limitations. 3 10 The
FPAC's Order of Conditional Approval would define the length of the trial
period and specify the requirements and conditions to be satisfied in order
for the applicant to obtain a final Approval Order for the product at the end
of such trial period. During the trial period, the firm would be required to
gather and analyze the relevant market data, which would provide an
empirical basis for the FPAC's re-evaluation of the product. In principle,
this is similar to the FDA's post-approval testing and review
and
Professor Carpenter's earlier proposal involving a limited roll-out for
consumer financial products.312 It is important, however, to realize the
inherent difficulty of conducting tightly controlled limited roll-out
experiments in the financial market. If a product has negative systemic
consequences, even a single transaction may cause irreversible damage to
the stability of the entire financial system. Moreover, most complex and

309. See supra notes 226-28 and accompanying text.
310. For example, the FPAC may require that the applicant enter into the proposed transaction
with, or sell the proposed financial product to, a limited number of target users that meet certain
criteria. The applicant may also be required to set aside additional capital and liquidity cushion for
trading and dealing in such conditionally approved instruments.
311. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
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potentially risky financial instruments are structured as bespoke
instruments, not meant for mass marketing.
The FPAC's Orders of Denial would be subject to judicial review in
the same manner as similar decisions made by other administrative
agencies. It is important, however, to avoid excessive and prolonged
litigation of the FPAC's decisions. The well-funded and organized
financial services industry, which stands to lose a great deal of profits
under the proposed product approval regime, is likely to fight the FPAC at
every turn and challenge the agency's every decision.
Designing
procedural rules governing the product approval process would require a
careful balancing of legitimate due process concerns against the need to
prevent potential abuses of procedural rights by private interests seeking to
*
314
undermine the
new regime.
Establishing a fair and effective process of administrative review of the
FPAC's Orders of Denial may provide a viable alternative to litigation.
Thus, it may make sense to establish internal appeals panels that would
hear aggrieved applicants' appeals of the FPAC's orders. Such panels may
be presided over by Administrative Law Judges and include not only
FPAC employees but also outside experts and representatives.
b. PublicAdvisory Council
The FDA's practice of using independent expert councils suggests a
potentially fruitful method of leveraging the FPAC's resources and
introducing an important element of tripartism into the product approval
process."1 The FPAC could establish the Public Advisory Council (the
"Council") specifically charged with representing an independent public
interest perspective in the process of licensing individual financial
products. The Council would comprise individuals who are independent
from both the industry and regulators and who are competent in issues of
financial regulation, such as academic experts, but also certain public

313. See, e.g., Brush, supra note 280 (describing recent industry lawsuits against the CFTC).
314. Again, it is critical that the statute leaves little ambiguity with respect to its policy priorities.
To this end, Congress may have to mandate a strong explicit presumption against excessive
complexity of financial products and to place the burden of overcoming that statutory presumption on
the Covered Institutions applying for approval of specific Covered Products.
315. For a discussion of the role of tripartism in financial services regulation, see Saule T.
Omarova, Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Guardians: Toward Tripartism in Financial Services
Regulation, 37 J. CORP. L. 621 (2012).
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figures (not holding any official post) and representatives of consumer and
other public interest groups.
The Council would function much like the FDA's scientific expert
committees.317 Its members would participate in the review and approval
process, along with the FPAC's staff. The Council would provide an
independent intellectual perspective on substantive and policy issues,
which is a key factor in overcoming deep cognitive effects of complexity
on regulators' thought process and in counteracting the tendencies toward
agency ossification and parochialism.3
As an active third-party
participant in the regulatory process, the Council would serve as a
safeguard of the integrity of that process and a mechanism diminishing the
threat of regulatory capture. 9
The creation of such an advisory body raises difficult issues with
respect to the process and criteria for selecting its members, the scope of
its powers and responsibilities, and the confidentiality of product-related
information. The FDA's independent expert committees could provide a
model for working out the operational details of the system.
c. Enforcement

The statute would generally prohibit offering to enter, or entering into,
a financial transaction directly or indirectly involving any Covered
Product in the absence, or not in accordance with the terms, of a valid
Approval Order issued by the FPAC with respect to such Covered
Product. Such transactions would be deemed void and unenforceable. The
statute would provide broad rescission rights and rights to sue for damages
to all third parties who, in good faith and without prior knowledge of the
violation, entered into such illegal transactions.
The statute would also provide a full range of familiar penalties, such
as monetary fines, disgorgement of profits from the illegal transaction, and
criminal liability for certain reckless or intentional violations. In addition,
the FPAC would have the authority to impose a wide range of
administrative sanctions, including imposition of specific prohibitions or
restrictions on business activities of the violating financial institutions and

3 16. See id.; see also Carpenter,supra note 108.
317. See supra notes 143-50 and accompanying text.
318. For a thoughtful argument on the importance of an independent intellectual perspective for
improving agency decision-making, see McDonnell & Schwarcz, supra note 91.
319. See Omarova,supra note 315.
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partial or total exclusion of such institutions and their individual
executives and employees from the market.320
B. But Would It Work? Potential Challenges and Criticisms
This Part outlines some of the key elements of the proposed regulatory
regime. Much of this discussion seeks to identify important issues that
require further analysis, rather than provide a complete design blueprint.
Undoubtedly, this proposal is likely to face serious implementation
challenges and invite numerous criticisms.
1. FinancialInnovation and Global Competitiveness
Perhaps the most common criticism of any reform proposal involving
government pre-approval of financial instruments is that it would stifle
financial innovation and hurt the global competitiveness of the U.S.
financial markets and institutions. As the examples of the FDA and
REACH show, this is a typical argument private industry actors use to
attack product approval regulation in any setting.321 Despite being framed
in purely economic terms, this objection is based on a normative
assumption that financial innovation and uninhibited growth of financial
markets are inherently beneficial and that their social utility is never to be
questioned. Therefore, the argument goes, the purpose of government
regulation should not be to interfere with financial innovation, but to
enable and support it.
Without denying the many benefits of financial innovation, it is critical
to remember that these phenomena can also cause significant economic
and social harms. The recent crisis demonstrated that unregulated financial
innovation can impose an unacceptably high price on society and,
especially, on its poorest members. The proposed product approval
scheme would not aim to stop all innovation. It would seek to control it in
order to ensure that only those innovations that are likely to produce real
economic benefits enter the market. To the extent this approach would
"stifle" unproductive financial speculation and arbitrage, it may strengthen

320. This is typically achieved through revoking professional licensing and similar measures. If
the FPAC is set up to exercise comprehensive regulatory and supervisory oversight of the new
category of Approved Dealers in Covered Products, such market exclusion would involve temporary
suspension or termination of the offender's registration as an Approved Dealer.
321. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 132, at 404 (discussing how large, globally-active chemical
manufacturers lobbied against REACH).
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the long-term resilience and viability of the financial system and broader
economy.
Maintaining global competitiveness presents a more difficult challenge.
Large financial institutions operate on a global scale and may easily
relocate their activities abroad in search of a less stringent regulatory
environment. There is often a trade-off between the policy goal of making
domestic markets more competitive and the goal of making those markets
safer and more stable in the long run. A thoughtfully designed product
approval regime could provide a framework for balancing these competing
policy considerations in the context of specific financial activities.
Ultimately, however, establishing a successful product approval regime in
the United States may require coordinated efforts to create similar regimes
in the key non-U.S. financial markets.322
2. "Command-and-Control"Regulation
Another potential criticism of the proposed product approval scheme is
that it represents a paternalistic and obsolete "command-and-control"
regulatory approach that is ill-suited for today's complex and dynamic
financial marketplace. Some variations of this argument may target
primarily the conceptual underpinnings of this proposal and extol the
dynamic adaptive qualities of complex systems or, on a more concrete
level, the virtues of a more collaborative regulatory regime involving all
stakeholders as equal participants. Other variations of this argument may
emphasize investor autonomy as a normative ideal or express distrust of
the government's ability to make better economic decisions.
These are all valid arguments. Product approval regulation is inherently
a top-down process, whereby the government controls market entry. In
that sense, it is paternalistic and has "command-and-control" elements. At
the same time, however, the proposed product approval scheme is
designed to operate primarily as a burden-shifting device rather than a
direct prohibition on individual products. It does not automatically deprive
financial institutions of vital business opportunities; it merely cures the
inherent informational asymmetry between private firms and government
regulators.

322. This problem is likely to accompany any significant domestic regulatory reforms in the
financial services market. For an analysis of the complex architecture and dynamics of international
financial regulation, see Christopher J. Brummer, Howi InternationalFinancialLaw Works (And How
It Doesn't), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011).
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From a practical standpoint, it is difficult to envision a workable nearterm solution to the problem of regulating an increasingly complex
financial system which would not rely at least on some form of "hard"
legal constraints on the excessive risk-taking and speculation that such
complexity enables.m Because reducing systemic complexity has
significant potential to enhance both financial stability and market
efficiency, instituting an ex ante product approval regime is better viewed
as a pragmatic approach that defies simple ideological labels.
3. FeasibilityChallenges
Finally, the critics of the proposed product approval scheme may
emphasize various technical and conceptual difficulties with designing and
implementing it. For instance, it is difficult to delineate precisely the scope
of the scheme's application, or to define with sufficient specificity what
constitutes an acceptable "economic purpose" of a complex financial
instrument. This indeterminacy directly affects potential costs and overall
viability of suggested reforms. Although this Article acknowledges and
addresses some of these issues, it does not purport to offer complete
solutions. Its purpose is to examine the basic concept of product licensing
and to offer a general approach to operationalizing it in the context of
financial services regulation.
It is also true that introducing a comprehensive product approval
regime is likely to be an expensive undertaking. Yet, whatever the ultimate
price tag of these reforms, it will pale in comparison with the potential
aggregate cost-monetary, social, and political-of another major
financial crisis. The world's leading economies simply cannot afford
another crisis of the same, or greater, magnitude as the last one. The costs
and benefits of this proposal should be assessed against that alternative.
Another potential challenge is the regulators' ability to administer a
comprehensive product approval regime in practice. Financial regulators
have lost credibility in recent years in light of the evidence of regulatory
capture, incompetence, and complacency in the pre-crisis era. 324 To many,
323. In certain contexts, traditional command-and-control regulatory methods may produce
greater benefits than market-based economic incentives. See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z.
Grossman, When Is Command-And-Control Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative
Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory Regimes for Environmental Protection, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887
(1999) (arguing that command-and-control environmental regulation can be, and has been, more
efficient than alternative market-based approaches).
324. See, e.g., THE LEVIN REPORT, supra note I1, at 161-243 (detailing how the Office of Thrift
Supervision consistently failed to prevent highly risky business practices at Washington Mutual, the
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the idea of regulatory agencies as effective gatekeepers, especially in the
complex and dynamic area of finance, may appear nalve and misguided.32 5
While regulatory capacity is a legitimate concern, it is hardly unique to the
current proposal3.326 Any regulatory regime may fail if the agencies are not
able or willing to implement it efficiently and responsibly. How to
improve regulators' capacity and incentives to act in the public interest is
an intensely debated question that is not likely to have a simple answer.327
Yet, it may be easier for the real-life imperfect regulators to cope with the
complexity of their regulatory terrain if the law imposes the burden of
explaining and justifying the need for such complexity on private market
participants who generate it.
As discussed above, implementation of the proposed product approval
scheme may require significant reform of the broader system of financial
sector regulation. Reorganizing and rationalizing the complex and
fragmented regulatory framework requires the presence of strong political
will, which does not appear likely in the near term.328 At the same time,
however, the political climate may change unexpectedly, often in response
to an economic crisis or another exogenous shock.329 In the meantime, it is
important to continue exploring the possibilities for devising more
effective regulatory mechanisms to reduce systemic risk in the financial
sector.

largest thrift under its jurisdiction).
325. See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1263 (2011) (arguing that state insurance regulators often fail to review homeowners insurance
policies in an effective manner).
326. See, e.g, Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: the Unfulfilled
Promise ofSection 23A ofthe FederalReserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011) (detailing the Federal
Reserve's practice of granting banks exemptions from statutory restrictions on affiliate transactions).
327.

See, e.g, PREVENTING CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE IN REGULATION, AND How

To LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2012); McDonnell & Schwarcz, supranote 91.
328. See Linda Feldmann, Peiw Survey: Partisanpolarization in U.S. hits 25-year high, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 4, 2012), available at http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/
0604/Pew-survey-Partisan-polarization-in-US-hits-25-year-high.
329. The unfolding sovereign debt crisis in Europe demonstrates that policy-makers and
legislators are increasingly prepared to impose strict top-down controls and prohibitions on certain
types of speculative financial transactions. Thus, in November 2011, the European Parliament adopted
a regulation banning any person in the European Union from entering into "naked," or uncovered,
credit default swaps referencing sovereign debt. See Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit
Default Swaps (COM(2010)0482), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=
TA&reference=P7-TA-2011-0486&language=EN.
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4. InformationalScreening as a PotentialAlternative
Given the various feasibility challenges described above, it may be
prudent to consider less radical alternatives to the proposed approach. One
such alternative measure could be the establishment of a purely
informational pre-market product screening regime.330 As discussed above,
one of the key benefits of an ex ante product approval regime is the
mandatory shifting of the burden to produce crucial information about the
products to the financial institutions designing and marketing them.331 It
may be possible to retain these informational benefits of an ex ante
product review without necessarily giving the regulators the power to
prohibit the marketing of any product. Better informational access should
improve the government's ability to regulate financial markets more
effectively and to take timely action with respect to potentially
troublesome systemic trends.332 The need to explain the purposes and the
nature of the financial products to the regulators should deter financial
institutions from creating instruments likely to raise too many difficult
questions. The firms would be expected to try to avoid negative comments
by the regulators reviewing their products, because it may lead to further
regulatory inquiries and tarnish the firm's reputation.
It is far from certain, however, that a purely informational regulatory
review of financial products, not backed by direct statutory authority to
stop them from entering the market, is likely to achieve its proclaimed
objectives. It is not clear what level of scrutiny would be appropriate for
this type of "soft" regulatory review and, more importantly, what effect
regulators' findings would have on financial intermediaries' ability to
increase systemic complexity, interconnectedness, and risk. Without a
clear threat of regulatory prohibition of the proposed activity, financial
institutions that stand to profit from such activity will be less forthcoming
with the relevant information. In the context of a purely informationgathering review, it would be more difficult for the regulators to justify
their demands for further disclosure and discussions over firms'

330. See, e.g., P. M. Vasudev, Credit Derivatives and the Dodd-Frank Act: Is the Regulatory
Response Appropriate? (Jan. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1984878 (proposing a pre-market screening procedure for financial
products).
331. See supra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
332. Given this link to systemic risk regulation, it may make sense to assign this pre-market
review function to the FSOC or the OFR, although that would require significant reconfiguration of
their current structure and duties.

140

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:63

complaints about unnecessary and meaningless delays. Routinely issued
pre-market regulatory comments on potential risks of individual financial
products, without any binding legal power, are likely to be ignored by
market participants and even the regulators themselves, especially in times
of rising asset prices. 333
Altering the financial services industry's conduct requires powerful and
tangible deterrents. 334 In effect, a pre-screening regime would act purely as
"disinfecting sunlight" 335 and leave far more room for a variety of
responses, public and private, to the uncovered information. It is doubtful,
though, that, without a "well-oiled shotgun behind the door,"336 any such
responses will be effective enough to prevent the excessive accumulation
of systemic risk and avert the next financial crisis. 337
CONCLUSION

This Article explores the possibility of creating a system of mandatory
pre-approval of complex financial products as an ex ante solution to the
problem of systemic risk containment. Building on the concept of
regulatory precaution borrowed from environmental and health law, and
elements of pre-CFMA regulation of commodity futures, the Article
outlines the broad contours of a new licensing scheme that would place the
burden of proving social and economic utility of complex financial
instruments on the intermediaries that structure and market them.
Fundamentally a thought experiment, this proposal seeks to enrich the
current policy debate by expanding the range of potentially plausible
reform options.

333. In our fragmented system of financial regulation, one can easily imagine a situation where
the agencies or staff responsible for prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions
would go about their daily duties without much regard for the non-binding commentary by the
regulatory personnel that had reviewed specific products before they began trading.
334. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward FinancialIndustry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV 411, 486-87 (2011) (arguing that a credible threat of government
intervention is necessary to alter the financial industry's conduct).
335. See Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1933)

("Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.").
336. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940).
337. It is important to emphasize the utmost significance of "disinfecting sunlight" for systemic
risk regulation. For a variety of reasons, however, it may be desirable to entrust the task of publicly
scrutinizing the actions of financial market actors and financial regulators to an independent public
interest representative. See Omarova, supra note 315 (proposing the creation of an independent
government instrumentality to act as a designated pubic interest representative with the broad statutory
authority to gather and publicize information relevant to financial systemic risk regulation).

